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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three separate empirical studies. Using a non-parametric regression
discontinuity design that compares candidates who barely win an election to those who barely
lose, the first study estimates the effect of incumbency on a candidate's electoral prospects in
India. Starting in 1991, I estimate that, rather than being at an advantage, incumbents are
actually fourteen percent less likely to win an election than similar non-incumbents. While the
available data prevent a formal test, the dominance of a single political party (the Indian National
Congress) before 1991 may have provided a framework in which experience was valuable
because incumbents who gained experience under the Congress system would interact with the
same system when reelected. Starting in 1991, however, no party could be counted on to control
parliament, making experience under the previous regime potentially less valuable.
The second study estimates the effects of new competitors on existing candidates in India
by taking advantage of a change in the election laws in 1996 that made it more difficult for
candidates to run for office. The law affected constituencies differently, allowing the use of both
across time and between constituency variation in the number of candidates to estimate the
impact of restricting the number of new candidates in an election. The resulting estimates
suggest that the reduction in the number of new candidates had a small, but measurable effect on
the probability that the average existing candidates would win election. However, there is
evidence of heterogeneity in the effect across candidates.
Finally, the third study presents the results of a two-year randomized evaluation of a
remedial education program in India. The remedial education program hires young women from
the community to provide remedial assistance to third and fourth grade children who have fallen
behind their peers. The program is extremely cheap (five dollars per child per year), and is easily
replicable. We find the program to be very effective, increasing learning by 0.15 standard
deviations in the first year, and 0.25 in the second year. The results are similar in the two grade
levels, and in the two cities.
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Chapter 1: Are Incumbents Really Advantaged?
The Preference for Non-Incumbents in Indian
National Elections
1.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature emphasizes the importance of political institutions in the process of
economic development. While the exact nature of economically viable institutions remain
unidentified, it is clear that the distribution of political power can determine the distribution of
resources, even in a democracy (Acemoglu, 2002). In India, for example, villages where
leadership positions are randomly reserved for female candidates are more likely to invest in
infrastructure that meets the needs of women (Chattopadhyay and Dulfo, 2003a). Similarly,
India reserves a large number of state and national parliament positions for historically
disadvantaged groups known as scheduled castes and tribes. When candidates from these groups
are elected, they use their influence to redirect resources to their constituents (Pande, 2003). The
fact that political power makes such a difference is the reason that democratic governments are
founded on the principle that voters should ultimately decide which representatives are chosen to
wield power.
The major risk in a democracy is that elected officials will become entrenched or that
running for office may simply prove too expensive. By the nature of the democratic system,
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incumbents are given access to resources and decision processes that non-incumbent challengers
do not have. If elected officials are able to use their political influence to remain in power,
voters will have no way to influence their policy decisions. Once entrenched, politicians are free
to take distortionary actions such as simple graft or the evisceration of property rights. Stronger
incumbents also raise the cost of entering politics because challengers must have sufficient
resources to overcome the advantage of incumbency. These costs may then skew the allocation
of political power even further towards the wealthy and effectively disenfranchise the poor, who
may not have the resources to support candidates to represent their views.
Though mostly about the United States, a large literature has investigated the degree to
which holding office affects a candidate's electoral prospects. These efforts have yielded two
sets of empirical facts. First, incumbents enjoy significant advantages compared to their non-
incumbent competitors. In terms of the raw probability of re-election, incumbents in national
congressional elections are fifty percent more likely than similar non-incumbent peers to be re-
elected (Lee, 2001). Second, the margin of victory of incumbents has increased significantly
over time (Alford and Hibbing, 1989; Collie, 1981; Garand and Gross, 1984). The notable
exception is Miguel and Zaidi's (2003) investigation of national elections in Ghana in which they
find no evidence to support an incumbency advantage.
In this paper, I study the effects of incumbency on candidates' prospects for election in
the Indian national parliament over the last fifteen years. Like in most developing democracies,
critics have claimed that entrenched politicians and social elites control the political process.
Running for office is expensive, and corruption seems to be rampant. Belying these criticisms,
however, is the vibrancy of the Indian political system. Compared to elections in the US, a large
percentage of eligible voters visit the polls, those voters have a dizzying array of candidates and
political parties from which to choose, and an active and free press informs their vote (Besley
and Burgess, 2002).
To estimate the effects of holding office on a candidate's probability of reelection, I use a
non-parametric regression discontinuity design. First, I calculate the margin of victory for
winning candidates as the winner's vote share less the vote share of the second place candidate.
Similarly, for losing candidates, I calculated the margin of victory by subtracting the winner's
vote share from the losing candidate's voter share. The election rules then guarantee that each
candidate wins (and thus becomes an incumbent for the subsequent election) if the candidate
10
gains a sufficient percentage of the vote that his or her margin of victory is greater than zero.
Stated differently, assignment to incumbency status is discontinuous at zero: Candidates with a
positive margin of victory win and those with a negative margin of victory lose. Because of the
discontinuity, it is possible to infer the causal effect of incumbency status by comparing
candidates that are just barely elected to those that just barely lose as long as all other candidate
characteristics that could influence the probability of being elected vary, on average,
continuously at zero (Lee, 2001; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003). Mathematically, I estimate the effect
of incumbency by non-parametrically estimating the relationship between the probability of
winning a given election and the margin of victory in the previous election while allowing for a
discontinuity at zero. The size of the discontinuity is then the causal effect of being an
incumbent prior to a given election.
The last fifteen years in India provide a particularly interesting environment for
conducting such a comparison. First, the Congress party which dominated Indian politics since
independence, lost its dominance in 1989. At the same time, the political system became much
more competitive with large increases in both the number of nationally competitive parties and
the number of candidates contesting in each constituency. Second, unlike in the U.S.,
constituencies in which candidates are barely elected make up over ninety percent of the
constituencies in India. As a set, the marginal constituencies are more than large enough to
change the balance of power in parliament, making an understanding of their dynamics important
in their own right. They are, however, also very similar to constituencies in which candidates
did not win by narrow margins suggesting that the marginal constituencies can shed light on the
size of the incumbency effect in general.
The estimate from the regression discontinuity design yields a very surprising result -
incumbents in India face an enormous disadvantage. Compared to similar non-incumbents,
incumbents are fourteen percent less likely to be elected to office.' To make up this gap an
incumbent would have to have won the previous election by an additional five and a half percent
of the popular vote, a change equivalent to an incumbent moving from the first to the thirty-fifth
percentile of elected officials ranked by margin of victory. For comparison, I also estimate the
effects of incumbency before 1991. While the interpretation of the results are not as clear, the
1 To avoid confusion, I will not report differences as relative changes unless explicitly stated. As a result, all
estimates of the difference will reflect the raw change in the probability of winning resulting from holding office
prior to entering the election.
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data suggest that prior to the last fifteen years, incumbents enjoyed advantages of six to eleven
percent.
While there is insufficient data to identify clearly the cause of the change, the shift in the
effects of incumbency seem to be related to the Indian National Congress party losing its
dominance of national elections. The largest drops in the effects of incumbency are concentrated
in constituencies that have either an incumbent affiliated with Congress or elected a Congress
candidates in at least half of the elections prior to 1991. Prior to 1991, experienced incumbents
are also more likely to be reelected than inexperienced incumbents and experienced incumbents
that belong to Congress are the most likely to be reelected. Starting in 1991, however, being an
incumbent is almost equally disadvantageous for all candidates, with congress candidates slightly
more disadvantaged. It is thus possible that the expectation of continued control of the
parliament by a single party meant that experience working with the party in the past would be
valuable in the party's subsequent parliamentary term. Incumbents were thus more valuable to
voters than non-incumbents by virtue of their past experience working in a parliament controlled
by the Congress party. After the fall of Congress in 1989, no party could be expected to hold
power after a given election, limiting the value of having learned to work within the previous
political regime and reducing the value of being an incumbent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
empirical strategy and provides a simple structural model of the electoral process. Section III
provides a brief description of the electoral process and history of Indian national parliamentary
elections. Section IV describes the available data, and Section V discusses the importance of
understanding the performance of incumbents in marginal elections in India. I present the
empirical results in Section VI. Finally, I conclude in Section VII.
1.2 Empirical Estimation Strategy
In this paper, I intend to estimate the degree to which being an incumbent before standing for
election affects a candidate's probability of election. This requires the estimation of the
difference in performance of a candidate in two states of the world: one in which the candidate is
an incumbent and one in which the candidate is not an incumbent. Since I can not observe a
candidate as both an incumbent and a non-incumbent in the same election, I instead resort to
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comparing the performance of candidates that are identical except for the fact that one holds
office immediately prior to the election. The identification problem in this context is to develop
a method that ensures that compared candidates differ only in their incumbency status.
Unlike researchers who focus on the effects of incumbency in the U.S., I focus on the
impact of incumbency on the probability of winning rather than the subsequent vote share.
There are several reasons for this difference. First, the meaning of the vote share is not well
defined in elections with varying numbers of candidates. Five percent of the popular vote, for
example, may be meaningless in an election between two candidates, but might be a large
margin in a first-past-the-post election with four candidates or more. Second, when considering
models of incumbent behavior, only the probability of winning influences the candidates. Vote
shares are important to the extent that they reflect these underlying probabilities, but it is the
underlying probability of reelection that ultimately matters. It is possible, for example, for the
margins of victory of two candidates to differ while their underlying probability of re-election
remains the same (Jacobson, 1987) despite the fact that the two statistics are strongly correlated.
The first problem in estimating the incumbency effects is to identify a pool of eligible
candidates. The candidates contesting the election of interest are an obvious choice, but since
there is often little information available about them, it is difficult to control for other differences
that may account for the differential performance of incumbents and non-incumbents. A
common solution is to use the pool of candidates in the election immediately preceding the
election of interest and to use the results of this first election as a means of controlling for
differences between the candidates in the subsequent election. This methodology can then be
refined by restricting the sample to specific types of elections or by supplementing with
additional information.
1.2.1 A Simple Model of Elections
The problems involved with this estimation strategy can be illustrated with a simple structural
model. First, I will restrict attention to a single constituency with N voters. I will refer to the
election of interest as election t and the preceding election as election t -1 . For simplicity, I
will assume that C candidates contest in election t -1 and that the same candidates contest in
13
election t .2 I will assume that voters vote for the candidate that in expectation will generate the
highest value return for them, and to allow for the possibility of strategic voting and other
possible correlations of values across voters, I will not restrict the initial distribution of these
values.
Let VSj be the actual vote share of candidate j in election t'. If Vi is the initial
-t-1
valuation of candidate j by voter i, then VSj can be calculated according to the following
equation:
-t-1 1 NVs Clc~ 2 r, ,) (1)
where V(c) is the valuation of the highest valued candidate for voter i, and 1(-) is an indicator
variable set to one if the given statement is true and zero if false. The vote share of candidate j
is simply the fraction of voters that value voting for candidate j the most. The "true" vote
share, however, will differ from the vote share observed in the election because random factors
(i.e. the placement of polling booths, traffic problems, etc.) that randomly affect voters voting for
a particular candidate. I will thus assume that the observed vote share received by candidate j
in election t' is given by VS,' = VS' + ' where 6' is a random variable with a zero mean.
To identify candidates, I will rank them by their observed vote share in election t-1 with
candidate C being the candidate with the largest actual vote share and candidate one having the
lowest. In a first-past-the-post election, candidate C will win the election t -1 and will be the
incumbent entering election t. I then define the margin of victory for candidate j, MVj - , as
follows. For the winning candidate, let MVc-1 = VSc- 1- VSc . For every other candidate, j <C,
let MVj-' = VSj-1 - VSc- . By definition, the margin of victory for the winning candidate is non-
negative and the margin of victory for losing candidates is non-positive.
At election t, voters' valuations of the candidates will change and the change in
valuation will change the underlying vote share. For expositional purposes, I will assume that
2 The primary disadvantage of identifying candidates through the prior election is that many of them will not contest
the election of interest. This is not a problem if the probability of rerunning is unrelated to whether or not the
candidate wins the first election, but this may not always hold true. This is not a problem over the last fifteen years
in India as I will discuss in Section VI.
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the change in vote share CVS, = VS, - VSj can be partitioned into an additively separable
function given by the following equation:
CVSj, = CVSj (e) + CVS(MVj-' )
where e is the change in experience of the incumbent elected in election t - 1. The point of this
partition is to highlight that there are two paths through which a candidate's underlying vote
share can change. First, voter's valuation of the candidate can change as a result of the candidate
holding office for a term. Second, however, the vote share could change for reasons not related
to the candidate's experience, and these effects are likely to differ depending on the vote share in
the previous election. If an incumbent wins by a large margin, for example, opposition parties
may decide to reduce the amount of campaign money they spend to support their candidates.
The probability of the incumbent winning election t is then given by
Pr[MVc-' + (VS, - VSc-l ) + ACVS (e) + LC VS(MVc-', MV'-') > ACVj <C] (2)
and the probability of any other candidate j < C winning the election is given by
Pr[MVj-' + (VSj - VSc )+ ACVS.(e) + ACVS(MVj-,MVj. ) > A'- ,Vj < C] (3)
where ACVSJ2(e)= CVS,.(e)-CVSj.(e) and
ACVS(MVj-', MVJ'.-) = CVS(MVt-') - CVS(MVj,-'). These equations describe a candidate's
probability of election by four terms: MVjt-' represents the relative strength of candidate j,
t-I -t-(VSj, - VSc ) gives the relative strength of other candidates, ACVS.(e) is the change in voter
share due to experience, and ACVS(MVjt-, MVjt-') is the change in vote share due to factors
other than experience. These equations also illustrate the challenge of comparing incumbents
and non-incumbents to estimate the effects of incumbency. Within this framework, the effects of
either being an incumbent or not being an incumbent are given by ACVS c (e) and ACVSj. (e). It
is clear from these equations, however, that differences in the probability of reelection are driven
both by the effects of incumbency and by pre-existing vote share differences and other factors
that could change the vote share a candidate receives.
Most researchers seek to hold these effects constant by controlling for differences in
observable characteristics or by taking advantage of natural experiments that limit the degree to
which incumbents can differ from non-incumbents. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) for example,
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focus in part on districts in which an incumbent won an open seat in the first election and correct
for attrition bias through a structural assumption regarding the functional form of the election
process. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) perform a similar analysis but focus on districts in
which the incumbent prior to the first election was forced from office due to term limits in order
to control for the endogeneity of an incumbent's decision about when to contest an election.
Because of the function form assumptions, however, these studies are limited in the degree to
which they can control for a candidate's quality or the quality of a candidate's competitors. For
example, if incumbents are at an advantage (disadvantage) in an election relative to non-
incumbents, then parties may place more (less) resources or nominate better (worse) candidates
in elections without incumbents, biasing estimates of the incumbency advantage upwards.
Similarly, candidates themselves differ in their strength. If a candidate's probability of being
elected can be estimated ex ante (perhaps because of matches between the candidate and the
characteristics of the district or because of a party's historical strength in a geographic area) and
opposition parties then field weaker candidates, candidates may be re-elected based upon their
strength as a candidate rather than any effects associated with holding office prior to an election.
1.2.2 Estimating the Effects of Being an Incumbent
As an alternative, I employ a regression discontinuity methodology. The general framework is
provided by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), and the application to elections is
suggested by Lee (2001)3 This approach is based upon the insight that while two candidates with
the same margin must also have the same incumbency status, it is possible to compare candidates
that have a different status as incumbents but have arbitrarily close margins of victory by
comparing incumbents who are barely elected to non-incumbents that barely lose. In the context
of the previous model, this amounts to comparing the probability of reelection as MV '-
approaches zero. The critical assumption of this methodology is that all of the other
characteristics of candidates that could affect their probability of reelection on average vary
continuously as a function of the margin of victory at zero. This allows incumbents and non-
3 Miguel and Zaidi (2003) have recently performed a similar analysis in Ghana. While they focus on political
patronage as well as the effects of incumbency, they find that on average incumbent and non-incumbents fair
similarly.
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incumbents to differ systematically, and requires only that on average those candidates that are
barely elected are similar to those candidates that barely lose. The major limitation of this
approach, however, is that it relies on marginal elections to estimate the incumbency effects and
these elections may, of course, not be representative of all elections.
In the structural model, this would only require that CVS(MVj'-') is continuous at
MVj'-1 = 0. To illustrate the effect of this assumption, consider the limits of equations (2) and
(3) as MV-' approaches zero for some candidate j. The fact that MV,'- l approaches zero for
some candidate j < C implies that both MV-Z and MVAc- also approach zero.4 At the limit, the
vote shares of candidates j, C -1, and C are all equal in election t -1. I will denote the limit
of the vote shares as VSt'-. Finally to further simplify the exposition, I will assume without loss
of generality that C = 4 and that AMV3t- converges to zero. In other words, I will assume that
four candidates are contesting an election and consider the case where the voter shares of three
candidates converge to a three-way tie.
The limit of (2) as the vote shares of the top three candidates converge is then given by
the following value:
Pr[ACVS(e)> Ae4,ACVS2(e)> 4,(VS - VS'1 )+CVS 4(e)> ASAC VS4(O, Mj't-l) > AE64] (4)
Similarly, the value of (3) can be rewritten in the following form for j, j'= 2,3, j j':
Pr[ACVS (e) > A,ACVS((e) > A,(S - VS'-+ AC)+ VS ACVS (O Mv '- ' ) > As] (5)
The assumption that CVS(MVj'-) is continuous at zero then guarantees that as the vote shares
converge ACVS~ (O,MV'-) = ACVS (O,MV'-) where j = 2,3. This leaves the changes due the
additional experience of the incumbent as the only differences between the probability of
reelection for the incumbent and the second and third ranked candidates. The other differences
that biased the comparison converge to zero with the margin of victory. Since the only
difference between the candidates is that one of them is an incumbent, this allows me to infer the
causal effect of incumbency on the probability of winning election t for candidates that barely
win or lose an election. Relying on these marginal candidates, however, is the main shortcoming
4If MV- -lO , then MV - ' - 0 since MVc-' = -MVc-'. So, if j = C -1, the result follows directly. If
j < C -1, MVc-1 -O 0 follows from the fact that MV'- 1 < O and MVJ-' < MVc-1.
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of the methodology because the effects of incumbency on candidates that win or lose by larger
margins need not be the same. These marginal elections alone may be interesting, as they are in
Indian parliamentary elections, but extrapolating the estimates to non-marginal candidates and
constituencies requires the assumption that these marginal elections are not systematically
different. In Section V, I demonstrate that in the current context, marginal and non-marginal
constituencies are in fact similar.
To estimate the effect of being an incumbent on the probability of winning an election, I
estimate the relationship between the probability of winning election t and the margin of victory
in election t -1 separately for incumbents and non-incumbents and then estimate the size of the
discontinuity that results for a margin of victory of zero. Formally, I estimate the following
relationship:
Wint =f, (MVj I MVk >O) + f (MVt: MV<O ) + l (6)
where Win'k is an indicator variable for whether or not candidate j, in constituency k won the
election in period t. The effect of being an incumbent is then measure by taking the following
difference:
lim f(MVI MV>O)- lim f2(MVI MV<O) (7)MV--O+ MV-.O-
where f and f2 are estimates of f and f2 respectively.
1.2.3 Incumbency Advantage or Disadvantage?
Empirically in the United States, incumbents do fare better than non-incumbents, and as a result,
a number of explanations have been offered to explain such an advantage. These explanations
range from models of asymmetric information (Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1989; Besley and Case, 1995; Rogoff, 1990) to the beneficial aspects of office
entitlements such as franking privileges, the ability to shape redistricting plans, seniority
privileges, and the potential for increased name recognition (Alford and Hibing; 1989). Nothing
in these models, however, guarantees an advantage, and many of them could just as easily
generate a disadvantage with minor changes in the underlying assumptions.
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Returning to the structural model from above, recall that voter i has an initial valuation
of candidate j that I am denoting V. The true vote share for candidate j is then the fraction of
voters who receive the highest expected value by voting for candidate j and is given by
equation (1). The general assumption behind the incumbency advantage is that after spending a
term in office the expected value of the incumbent, candidate C, increases. Let V(e) = S(e) be
the value of the incumbent due to experience so that the value of the incumbent for an arbitrary
voter is given by Vc + V(e). Let e be the number of terms the incumbent has held office. The
basic assumption in the models that generate an incumbency advantage is that S'(e) > 0 so that
after spending a term in office voters expect that voting for the candidate is more valuable than
they expected before election t -1. This change in expectation could result from any of the
explanations listed above. The incumbent may have more experience allowing her to work more
effectively within the established political system, she may have gotten access to resources that
allow her to improve or expand her public image, or by being in office voters may have learned
more about her abilities.
The change in vote share of each candidate due to the increased experience is then given
by the following equations:
CVSc(e)= 1(V c +V(e+l) V(c) &Vc + V(e) < V()) (8)
N i=1
N
CVS, (e) = - I A (Vc + V(e + 1) > V(c) & Vj' = V()), j < C (9)
N i=1
The incumbent gains votes on average from voters for whom the increase value of voting for the
incumbent is enough that they gain more by voting for the incumbent than their previously
highest ranked candidate (C). Similarly, candidates that were previously the most valuable vote
for those voters proportionally lose votes. The higher vote shares mean that on average the
incumbent also receives a higher measured vote share compared with other candidates and the
increased expected value translates into a higher probability of winning than non-incumbents.
For marginal candidates where the probability of victory is given by (4) and (5), this change is
the only difference between the candidates.
The assumption, however, that the expected value of a candidate increases after a period
in office is questionable. While incumbents certainly develop experience working within the
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existing political system they may use that experience to pursue activities that are not in the best
interests of voters like pet causes or project or even corruption. To account for these divergent
effects, consider a different specification of voters' valuation of experience, V(e)=(-G(e))(S(e))
where the increased service provided to voters is given by S(e) and the negative effect, which I
will refer to as the graft effect, is given by G(e). As before, I assume that candidates become
more adept at serving voters as they gain experience (S '(e) > 0 ). I also, however, assume that
the graft effect becomes larger with experience (G '(e) > 0 ) as candidates get more experienced
influencing the civil system and develop the ability to pursue their own agenda. Simple
differentiation yields the following relationship between a change in experience and the average
expected value of voters:
V'(e) = (1- G(e))S '(e) - G '(e)S(e) (10)
If V '(e) > 0, then the valuation of the incumbent follows the process laid out in equations (8) and
(9). If V '(e) < 0, the process runs in the opposite direction with voters that previously valued
voting for the incumbent the most switching to other candidates, making incumbents less likely
to win election t.
In what follows, incumbents switch from being at an advantage before the 1991 election
and then fall to a disadvantage starting with the 1991 election. Equation (10) suggests that this
can occur in two ways. First, the levels of provided service and graft could change even if the
marginal ability to engage in the activities due to increased experience remains the same.
Second, the relative marginal returns to experience could change. Specifically, either candidates
might become relatively more effective at diverting resources to personal gain or they may
become less effective at serving their constituents.
While the data is insufficient to identify the actual cause of the change, I will argue that
the data seems consistent with a model in which Congress' dominance provided a relatively
stable structure in which because Congress could always be expected to control parliament,
voters could expect that experience in the previous term would prove valuable systemic
experience in the subsequent term. With the end of Congress's dominance in 1989, control of
parliament switched between parties making experience under the previous regime less valuable.
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This change in the political structure then resulted in a system in which as politicians gained
more experience and influence they become more likely to pursue activities that are not in the
best interest of voters.
1.3 Indian Political System and Lok Sabha Elections
The current political institutions took shape shortly after India gained independence from Great
Britain in 1947. The Indian form of government is very similar to both the US and British
systems. Like the US, India has a federal system with thirty-two semi-autonomous states and
union territories joined under a single central government. The legislature comprises two houses
of parliament: an upper house (Rajya Sabha) and a lower house (Lok Sabha) which is the focus
of this study. All members of the upper house are elected by state legislatures except for twelve
members appointed by the president by virtue of their expertise in particular subjects like art,
history, science, etc. Except for two seats, appointed by the president to represent the Anglo-
Indian community (should he or she feel that the community is not adequately represented by the
other elected members), all members of the lower house are directly elected by all citizens over
the age of eighteen. A fraction of these seats can only be contested by members of historically
disadvantaged groups designated as either scheduled castes or scheduled tribes.5 The number of
seats in both houses allotted to each state is proportional to the population of the state. There are
currently 545 members of the Lok Sabha elected from 542 constituencies and 235 members of
the Rajya Sabha. The president, elected by members of parliament and state officials, serves as
the head of state while the Prime Minister, appointed by the president from the party or coalition
enjoying majority support in the Lok Sabha, implements the directives of the legislature and
oversees the day-to-day functioning of the government.
Constituencies for the lower house are drawn by an independent, legislatively created
Delimitation Commission. The original intent was to redraw the boundaries after each decennial
census to ensure that each constituency had roughly the same population. In practice,
constituencies have been redefined twice since they were originally set for the 1951-1952
election: once in 1963 and again in 1973. Under a 1976 constitutional amendment, constituency
5 The goal of this policy is to counter caste based discrimination and the historically disadvantaged socio-economic
positions of these groups.
21
boundaries were frozen until after the 2001 census to ensure that states' family planning efforts
did not jeopardize their representation in the national legislature.
Elections are organized by a constitutionally empowered organization called the Election
Commission of India. The commission is staffed by three members appointed by the president,
and has the responsibility of overseeing the election of all state and national parliaments and
elections to the offices of the president and vice-president. Shortly before the target date for an
election, the Commission formally announces the up-coming elections at which time special
rules governing the behavior of political parties and candidates come into effect. Candidates are
then nominated within each constituency, at least two weeks are provided for campaigning, and
finally the polling begins. Results for a given constituency are usually announced a day after
polling. All races are first-past-the-post with the candidate receiving the largest percentage of
eligible votes winning regardless of the proportion of votes received. National elections are an
enormous undertaking. Due the size of the country, national elections occur over at least three
days. There are currently over 600 million eligible voters that vote in 800,000 polling stations.
In 1996 general election, the commission employed almost 4 million people, counted over 2.5
million ballot boxes, and spent the equivalent of over $US 100 million (ECI, 2003).
In practice, national parliamentary elections were dominated by the Congress party who,
except for a brief three year period starting in 1977,6 held power by wide margins until the 1989
election. Before the 1989 election, a large scandal broke, in which officials received kickbacks
for the purchase of military hardware. The new scandal reopened an old wound. Congress had
always been beset by corruption charges, and Sanjay Gandhi, the older brother of the Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, had been notorious for profiting at the public's expense. Possibly due to
these revelations, Congress lost in 1989 for the first time to an un-united opposition, signaling
the potential for a multi-party democracy in India. To make matters worse, charges of vote
rigging emerged in Rajiv Gandhi's district of Amethi. As one Indian scholar notes, "The
November 1989 General Elections in India put an end to what was widely accepted as the
unavoidable and permanent monopoly of power by a single party in power which ruled the
6 In 1975, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed martial law and initiated a period known as the Emergency.
During the next twenty-one months, the government initiated a policy of clearing slum areas, relocating their
inhabitants, and forcing many poor individuals to undergo sterilization procedures. Partly as a result of alienating
the poor, a core constituency, and also a result of the opposition parties merging to form a single united party,
Congress lost the first post-Emergency election in 1977. While there is considerable debate about the sources of
Congress support in the next two elections, Congress won both of them by very wide margins. Until the 1989
elections, the loss in 1977 was seen by many as a possible anomaly.
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country for 42 years, except for a brief interlude, when the Janata Government was at the Centre
(Ahuja, 1992)." Since 1989, no party, including congress, has ever again won an outright
majority in a national election.7
After the 1989 elections, a number of political trends emerged. First, the Congress party,
while still powerful, generally fared as well as other major parties over the period in stark
contrast to its previous success (Figure 1). Second, the political environment became much more
competitive. As Figure 2 shows, the average number of candidates in each district increased to
the point where the Election Commission felt it necessary to increase the deposits and
nomination requirements in 1996.8 The number of nationally competitive political parties also
increased significantly (Figure 3) as previously state and local parties vied for a larger role in
national politics. Starting in 1989 control of parliament began to shift between parties and
coalitions and no one coalition or party could expect to win. Finally, while always significant in
India, communal conflicts became increasingly prominent in national politics. Hindu-Muslim
conflicts have sparked many large scale riots over a mosque that is reputed to have been built
centuries ago by a Moghal invader on the ruins of Hindu temple in Ayodhya and propelled a
number of religiously oriented parties onto the national political scene. The once ardently (and
now somewhat moderated) Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has even
managed to form a coalition government after the national elections in 1998 and 1999.
1.4 Description of the Data
In addition to holding all elections in India, the Election Commission of India also releases
comprehensive reports on the outcome of every state and national election. From the ECI, I was
able to obtain the results for all thirteen national parliamentary elections (1951, 1957, 1962,
1967, 1971, 1977, i1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, and 1999). For each candidate in each
constituency, the ECI releases the individual's party, the number of votes the candidate receives,
and the candidate's gender. For each constituency, the ECI also releases the number of
candidates that were nominated, rejected, and who eventually contested along with the number
7 Though in the Tenth Lok Sabha they would build an outright majority for the last time through bye-elections and
other members joining the Congress party.
8 I am currently investigating the role that increase political competition played in the change in the effects of
incumbency status.
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that officially withdrew and the number that forfeited their deposit. They also report the number
of polls, number of eligible voters, the number of actual votes, and the number of votes rejected.
While comprehensive, these data do have a number of short comings. Most unfortunate
is the fact that the ECI does not consistently record the names of candidates. Variation occurs
along four primary dimensions. First, for a given name, the spelling can vary. Some of the
discrepancies are clearly the result of the ambiguity resulting from the transliteration of names
into English. However, there are also a number of spelling variations that are just mistakes.
Second, there is variation in which names are reported. In some elections, the ECI may list two
names and in another three or four. Third, names that are reported separately in one election can
be combined into an individual name in another. Finally, descriptors like the name of a
candidate's relation, the candidate's profession, and honorifics are also inconsistently recorded.
The methodology that I employ requires me to track each candidate's political career
through each election, and the fact that names are inconsistently recorded complicates this. My
solution is a simple algorithm that allows me to mechanically match candidates over time within
a given constituency. I developed this algorithm by manually matching the names of candidates
in five constituencies, generalizing the characteristics of the differences in the way that names
were recorded, and applying this methodology to all candidates. Specifically, I first match all
names as given in the data across all thirteen elections. I then iteratively relax the definition of a
match by allowing for, in order, omitted or mis-ordered names, in-accurate divisions between
names, and finally spelling differences of a character or less. Because there are over 40,000
names in the data set, the potential for mis-matched names is large. To control for this, I match
only within a given constituency over time which is possible because the definitions of the
constituencies were frozen by parliamentary mandate after the Emergency.9 I can thus use the
results from any constituency for which I have regularly reported data for each election from
1977 to 1999.
In addition to the name issues, however, there are a few inconsistencies in the timing of
elections as well as the reporting of results from some constituencies. First, the ECI has not
consistently reported the occurrence or outcomes of bye elections.l° As a result, I am forced to
ignore these elections. Second, even regular elections in some areas have not been consistently
9 It is, of course, possible that candidates will change constituencies over time, and I check for bias resulting from
the effect below.
'O These are elections held to fill a position vacated prior the subsequent national election.
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held or reported. Elections in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam have at one
time either been canceled or delayed because of communal unrest. Additionally, the following
districts do not report results for each year after the emergency: Purnea and Patna in the state of
Bihar, Mizoram in the state of Mizoram, Meerut in Uttar Pradesh, Shillong in Meghalaya, and
Daman and Diu in the state of Daman and Diu. Eliminating the districts with inconsistent
reports for regular elections then leaves me with a data set reflecting 504 of the 543
constituencies in India.
1.5 Representativeness of Marginal Elections
As mentioned in Section II, the major limitation of the regression discontinuity approach is that it
relies on candidates that barely win or lose elections to estimate the incumbency effects for
candidates in general. Results from these marginal elections are potentially valuable for two
reasons. First, if marginal constituencies are common enough to determine the control of
parliament, then understanding the effects of incumbency in these constituencies is important in
its own right. Second, however, if marginal constituencies do not differ significantly from non-
marginal constituencies, then it is reasonable to assume that the measured incumbency effects are
applicable to all constituencies.
In this study, both of these justifications support the importance of the regression
discontinuity results. In India, constituencies in which the decision is marginal could easily
determine which party or coalition controls the parliament. Starting in 1991, over half of the
constituencies in an average election have a margin of victory of less than ten percent. A party's
ability to win these constituencies alone would be enough to control the Lok Sabha. Through
1989, the outcomes of twenty-nine percent of constituencies were determined by a margin of less
than ten percent. While smaller this is still a significant percentage of constituencies and could
make any party a formidable presence in the parliament.
Additionally, however, marginal constituencies are very similar to non-marginal
constituencies. Table 1 shows the descriptive characteristics of marginal and non-marginal
constituencies. The first two columns display the average characteristics for the period starting
in 1991. On average these constituencies are very similar, and do not support the contention that
marginal and non-marginal constituencies differ systematically. This should not be surprising,
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however, since over ninety percent of constituencies at some point experience an election where
the margin of victory is less than ten percent. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 list the
differences for the period immediately after the Emergency .1 The results are generally the
same. The lack of any systematic difference between marginal and non-marginal constituencies
suggests that the results for marginal constituencies are likely to reflect the effects of
incumbency in general.
1.6 Estimation of Incumbency Effects
1.6.1 Estimation Method
Figure 4 graphically presents the central result of this paper - a graph of the relationship between
the probability of re-election and the margin of victory in the previous election (described by
equation (6)).12 The figure depicts a local polynomial estimation of the probability of winning a
given election (y-axis) as a function of the margin of victory in the previous election (x-axis).
The black dots represent the average probability of election for all candidates that fall within a
two and a half percent interval centered at the point on the x-axis at which the dot is located.
The size of each dot is directly proportional to the number of observations that fall in the
respective interval. Generally, as one would expect, the estimated function fits the average
probabilities of winning quite well, and the probability of winning increases in the margin of
victory - except for candidates with a zero margin of victory. At zero, the right and left hand
limits are visibly different suggesting that incumbents are about fourteen percent less likely to
win than their non-incumbent competitors.
Figure 5 depicts the relationship using the entire support, highlighting the importance of
the regression discontinuity design. A simple comparison of the reelection rates of all
candidates, listed in Table 2, suggests that incumbents are at a thirty-seven percent advantage
compared to non-incumbents. As explained previously, however, this sample includes both very
strong incumbents that derive their power from sources other than their office and conversely,
" In comparison to the period starting in 1991, candidates before 1991 seem to have relatively less experience. This
result, however, is probably an artifact of my inability to measure candidate's experience before the emergency. As
a result, all candidates' experience is measured starting in 1977.
12 Candidates that run in the first election but not the second are recorded as having lost the second election.
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very poor candidates who lose by very large margins and have little chance of building a vote
base. The first three columns in Table 3 illustrate the differences between these candidates. On
average, incumbents are more likely to be female, have substantially more political experience,
and are more likely to belong to one of the major parties. In addition to the difference in
incumbency status, the difference in the reelection rates thus likely reflects other differences
between the candidates.
Restricting the comparison to only candidates that win or lose by less than a fifteen
percent margin eliminates the poorest and strongest candidates, reducing the measured advantage
to twenty-two percent. Reducing the sample further, however, to those winning or losing by less
than two and a half percent, yields an incumbency disadvantage of five percent. If the continuity
assumption holds, then these candidates will differ less along both observable and unobservable
characteristics, making their relative performance more indicative of the effects of incumbency
in general. The last three columns in Table 3 confirm this conjecture for characteristics
observable in the data. The differences between incumbents and non-incumbents in this range
are quite small. Compared to non-incumbents, incumbents, for example, are six tenths of a
percent less likely to be female, have marginally more political experience, and are almost
equally likely to belong to a major party.
While these comparisons of candidates that barely won and loss are suggestive, the
comparison ignores both the slope of the data near the discontinuity and the information
available in the rest of the data set. A more precise comparison can be made by estimating
equation (6) and comparing the left and right hand limits directly. In most cases, the
discontinuity can be estimated simply by specifying a parametric relationship between the
variables of interest and including an indicator variable for whether or not a candidate was an
incumbent. This approach, however, is problematic in the context of Indian parliamentary
elections. As Figure 5 shows, a large number of candidates run for office, perform poorly, and
have very little hope of winning the subsequent election. This mass of candidates, far from the
discontinuity, exerts tremendous influence over the estimate of the left hand limit of the function
at zero. As a result, the estimates are very sensitive to the order of the polynomial used in the
specification, making it difficult to estimate the endpoints without additional information
regarding the true functional form. The same is true for estimations using probit and logit
models.
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Given the uncertainty regarding the functional form, the natural solution to this problem
is to use a semi-parametric estimate for the relationship which would allow more flexibility in
the specification of the functional form. In regression discontinuity context, however, the
discontinuity itself becomes a problem since smoothness is one of the underlying characteristics
usually assumed by semi-parametric estimators. One way to resolve this problem is to estimate
the semi-parametric relationship on either side of the discontinuity and take the difference of the
conditional expectations at the discontinuity point itself. Unfortunately, many estimators are
biased at the boundaries requiring the use of smaller bandwidths that slow the rate of
convergence of the point estimates.
Following the work of Hahn, Tadd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) who suggest avoiding
these biases by using local polynomial regression techniques developed by Fan (1992; Fan and
Gijbels 1996), Porter (2002) develops a general estimator that achieves the optimal rate of
convergence in the non-parametric framework. Using the local polynomial regression estimator,
I estimate the following function:
Winjk =f (MVtI MVtk >0) + f2(MVJ,| MVjt <0) + a(MVt )E
where is assumed to be independent and distributed according to the standard normal
distribution. Within this framework, the value of J; or f 2 at x is estimated by finding / 0 where
p,0 and p, minimize the following function at x:
E {Win - Po- /(MVtl- x)}2Kh (MVjt- x)
where Kh(z) = 0.75(1-z2 ) is the Epanechnikov Kernel.'3 I select a uniform bandwidth according
to the following two-step process. First, I make a preliminary estimate of the bandwidth using a
cross-validation estimator. Second, using this initial bandwidth estimate, I then estimate the
mean integrated square error of the estimated function and choose the bandwidth that minimizes
the estimate. I can then estimate the discontinuity of the function at zero by subtracting the left
hand limit at zero of the estimate of f 2 from the estimated right hand limit of fi at zero as in
equation (7).
13 Unlike other kernel estimators, the Epanechnikov kernel is always the optimal choice for Local Polynomial
Regression Estimator.
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The bandwidth estimate chosen by this selection algorithm then converges to zero fast
enough as the sample size grows that the distribution of the estimated discontinuity converges to
the following distribution:
/'(a'- a) d - N(O, r2+ (0) + 2-()elr-Arlel)
go(O)
where a is the true size of the discontinuity, ti is the estimated discontinuity, g(O) is the
density of MVj(;' evaluated at zero, and a2+ (0) and a 2- (0) are the right and left hand limits of
thevarianceestimate. Theterms e, F,and A aredefinedas e =(1,0)', F=[ ° ],and
A = [ where k = Kh(u)ukd and 8k = fK (u)ukdu.
A=4 451 '32 where vk=0 0
Compared with other estimation techniques, this process has two potential problems.
First, as with most non-parametric estimators, my estimates are not unbiased, but any reduction
in bias would come at the cost of an increase in the variance of the estimate. This is further
complicated by the fact that the discontinuity in question occurs at an inflection point of the
function. Since the function is concave to the left of zero and convex to the right, this bias
should cause me to under-estimate slightly the size of the discontinuity. Second, when
estimating the variance of the error terms, I control for nothing more than heteroskedasticity as a
function of the margin of victory. This is problematic since a misspecification of the correlation
of error across treated and untreated observations can bias the estimated standard deviation of the
point estimates.
To gauge the magnitude of these potential problems, I also estimate the incumbency
advantage using a spline estimator with knots at -45, -35, -25, -15, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 25, 35, and 45
and including both year and constituency fixed effects. All of the estimates are clustered at the
state level to avoid making strong assumptions about the form of variance/covariance matrix of
the error terms and to allow for the possible non-independence of error terms. Since the spline
estimator is more efficient and generates results consistent with the local polynomial regression,
I use the spline estimator to estimate the ancillary results which are often based upon subsets of
'4 I estimate the variance of the disturbance term at the right and left hand limits (i.e. allowing for heteroskedasticity
conditioned on the margin of victory) using the density weighted process outlined in both Porter (2002) and Hardle
(1990).
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the data. Finally, for reference, I include two additional estimates: a simple linear fit of the data
that lie within a ten percent interval around zero and a quadratic polynomial fit using all of the
data. The linear fit summarizes the data directly adjacent to the point of discontinuity, but is
inefficient because it ignores the remaining data.
1.6.2 Incumbency Effects: 1991 - Present
The first six rows in Table 4 exhibit the results of these estimations, which confirm the graphical
depiction of the discontinuity in Figure 4. These results are not conditioned on a candidate
contesting the current election and candidates that fail to contest are assumed to have lost. The
first column is the right hand limit of the function in Figure 4 or the probability of a candidate
that was barely elected in the first period winning in the subsequent period. The second column
contains the probability of victory for candidates that barely lost the first election. Finally, the
third column is the difference between these values. As usual, the standard deviation of each of
the point estimates is in parenthesis below the estimate. The bias in the non-parametric estimates
due to the inflection point does not seem to be a problem since all of the estimates are similar.
On average, being an incumbent makes a candidate about fourteen percent less likely than a non-
incumbent to win an election. The difference is also statistically significant under each treatment
of the error terms, though the clustered standard errors are much larger than those of the non-
parametric estimate (5.98 versus 1.92).
As explained in Section II, the ability to interpret this difference as a causal relationship
depends critically on the assumption that all other characteristics that affect a candidate's
probability of being reelected vary continuously as a function of the previous margin of victory
at zero (i.e. that CVS(MVf-') is continuous at MVj!-1 = 0). While it is impossible to completely
verify the validity of this assumption, I can verify it for candidate characteristics observable in
my data set. The seventh through eleventh rows of Table 4 show this comparison using the
spline estimator for four characteristics: membership in the Congress party, number of pervious
electoral victories since 1977, number of years experience as a member of the Lok Sabha since
1977, and number of elections contested since 1977. All of the estimated differences are
statistically and practically insignificant, suggesting that, at least at the margin, the candidates are
comparable.
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The remaining rows of Table 4 decompose the source of the incumbency effect into the
probability of running in the second election and the probability of winning conditional on
running. Row twelve shows the estimated probability of running in the subsequent election for
marginal incumbents and non-incumbents. In previous studies that find advantages to
incumbency status, incumbents are much more likely than non-incumbents to run for reelection.
This can bias the estimates of the incumbency effects if a systematic relationship exists between
a candidate's probability of running again and the candidate's probability of reelection. As row
twelve illustrates, over the period in question, incumbents and non-incumbents are equally likely
to run for re-election. This relationship is depicted in Figure 6 using the spline estimate of the
function. As one would expect the probability of contesting in the subsequent election increases
with one's margin of victory, but there is almost no difference in the probabilities of those
candidates just barely elected or not elected.
This allows for a straightforward interpretation of row thirteen, which reports the
probability of victory conditional on a candidate contesting the current election. Assuming that a
candidate runs a second time, not holding office increases ones chances of reelection by almost
twenty-eight percent. Both this and the unconditional estimate are enormous effects. In practice,
it would take significant effort to make up such a disadvantage. On average, for example, an
incumbent would have to win by an additional five and a half percent of the popular vote, a
change equivalent to an incumbent moving from the first to the thirty-fifth percentile of elected
officials ranked by margin of victory.
1.6.3 Robustness
Because I do not know with certainty which names correspond to the same candidate, I had to
use the name matching algorithm explained in Section IV. This algorithm, however, can create
biases in two different ways. First, if the equivalence relationships are too general, then matches
between names will occur randomly. This effect will attenuate any measurable differences
between incumbents and non-incumbents because both are treated in the same increasingly
random fashion. To check for this, I estimated the effects of incumbency using the spline
estimator for three different sets of equivalence relationships. The results of which are displayed
in the first three rows of Table 5.
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In the first row, I consider two names to match if and only if the exact string provided by
the Election commission matches. In the second row, I also identify individual names within the
given string, allow for the possibility that all names are not reported in each period, and also
allow for the possibility that the names were mis-ordered (i.e. by being listed last name then first
with the comma omitted). The third row presents the equivalence relationships used for the
estimates in Table 4, and is the same as the relationships for row two with the exception that I
allow the names to differ by one character. The results suggest that the relationships are in fact
not too general since the estimated difference is the same for each set of equivalence
relationships. Generalizing the equivalence relationships from full string matching to the
matching of individual names increases the estimated probability that incumbents or non-
incumbents will be elected, but it does not affect estimated differences in these probabilities.
Allowing the single character deviation has almost no effect either on the estimation of the levels
or the difference.
Another problem arises from the possibility that candidates may play upon name
recognition. If competitors, for example, seek to confuse voters by nominating candidates with
names similar to widely recognized or particularly strong candidates (for example, a particularly
strong incumbent), the matching of incumbents' names may be more likely to generate an
ambiguous match, making it more likely that my algorithm will match the incumbent to a weaker
competitor that loses the subsequent election. An ambiguous match can occur in three ways.
First, two candidates in the first election could be matched to the same candidate in the
subsequent election. Second, a single candidate can be matched to two candidates in the
subsequent elections. Because I am interested in a candidate's performance over time, however,
it is also possible that allowing a match between a name in the first election and the subsequent
election will create an inconsistency with another name already matched to one of the two
names. In practice, if this effect exists, it is negligible. Row four of Table 5 displays the results
of the model depicted by equation (6) but with probability of candidate's name being involved in
an ambiguous match as the dependent variable. As the fourth row indicates, however, the
probability of an ambiguous match is very low for marginal candidates and at most, this effect
could change the estimated incumbency effects by 1.36 percent.
Finally, it is not uncommon for candidates in India to change constituencies. If this
behavior is more likely for incumbents than non-incumbents, then because I match only within
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each constituency, I will be more likely to record an incumbent as having lost an election due to
not rerunning when in fact, the candidate contested in another constituency. An easy solution
would be to match candidates across all constituencies, but unfortunately, it becomes too likely
at that point that a given match will prove ambiguous. Instead, I perform another matching of
the candidates, matching within party rather than within constituency.15 I can then record
whether or not a match occurred within the same constituency or across constituencies, leaving
open only the rarer possibility that a candidate changes both parties and contests in a different
constituency. The fifth row of Table 5 presents the results of an estimation of the differential
relationship between incumbency and the probability of changing constituency. While the
difference is almost statistically significant at the ten percent level, the point estimate is only
2.21 percent, suggesting that at most 2.21 percent of the estimated incumbency disadvantage
results from candidates switching constituencies.
1.6.4 Previous Periods
Because of the large differences in the political climate prior to 1991, it is useful to ask whether
or not the effects of incumbency were different before 1991. Table 6 shows the estimated
advantage of being an incumbent for each national election, except for those in 1951 and 1977.16
While not all of the point estimates are significant, it is clear that there was a break between the
1989 election and the 1991 elections. Before 1991, incumbents enjoy advantages of varying
sizes, but starting in 1991, being an incumbent becomes a disadvantage in each election.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the non-parametric estimation of the relationship between the
probability of victory in a given election and the margin of victory in the previous election.
These figures differ from the Figure 4 in two ways. First, allowing for the discontinuity, there is
at best a weak increasing relationship between the margin of victory and the probability of
reelection. Second, however, the behavior at the discontinuity is the opposite of that shown in
15 In India political parties tend to divide frequently. So, in the process of matching names within parties, I take care
to group all of the splinter parties together when I encounter a party that has split.
16 These years are omitted because there is no prior election to use to identify a sample of candidates. The election
in 1951 is simply the first election ever. The election in 1977 is the first election after the emergency. Matching
candidates from the 1971 election to outcomes in the 1977 election is prevented both by the imposition of martial
law which made the experience of holding office over this period qualitatively different than holding office in other
terms and by the fact that the constituency definitions changed after the 1971 elections.
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Figure 4 with incumbents being more likely to be elected than non-incumbents. The differences
in the discontinuity are formalized in Tables 7 and 8 which present, for the pre-Emergency17 and
pre-1991 periods respectively, the same specifications that were presented in Table 4. Prior to
the Emergency, incumbents enjoyed an advantage of being eleven percent more likely to win
than non-incumbents. In the 1980, 1984 and 1989 elections, this advantage falls to about six to
nine percent and becomes statistically insignificant. Finally, despite the insignificance of the
level, the change that occurs after the 1989 election (column four) is statistically significant,
highlighting the importance of the political shift that occurred between the 1989 and 1991
elections.
The results for both the pre-Emergency and pre-1991 periods are strikingly similar to the
results found for the United States Congressional elections by Lee (2001). First, incumbents are
at an advantage when compared to non-incumbents. Second, part of the source of the
incumbency advantage comes from the fact that non-incumbents are less likely than incumbents
to rerun. As the twelfth rows in Tables 7 and 8 show, incumbents are seventeen (Pre-
Emergency) and thirteen percent (Pre-1991) more likely to contest the subsequent election. In
fact, the effect is large enough to constitute the entire advantage, raising questions about the
cause and size of the effect. If, for example, winning candidates find it easier to garner support
for a subsequent bid for election, then on average incumbents will prove more likely to win, not
because they are stronger candidates, but because they are simply more likely to appear in the
subsequent election.'8
17 Unlike the period after the emergency, the political boundaries did change before the emergency. Rather than
match names within constituency, I match instead by state which is feasible since, relative to after the Emergency,
the number of total candidates is small. Additionally, for elections in 1951 and 1957, a number of constituencies
elected two or three candidates. In these cases, all elected candidates are assumed to be incumbents. The margin of
victory for winners is then calculated relative to the unelected candidate with the largest percentage of votes and the
margin of victory for losers is calculated relative to the winner with the least votes.
18 The interpretation of this effect as a bias depends critically on the definition of the incumbency effect. It could be
argued, for example, that garnering support for re-election could be a component of the incumbency advantage. The
goal of this estimation procedure, however, is not to estimate the relative strength of incumbents and non-
incumbents over time, but to answer the counter-factual question, "How strong would an incumbent have been in an
election had he or she not held office prior to the election?" Under this interpretation, anything that differentially
affects the rate at which incumbents and non-incumbents run for office could bias the estimated incumbency effects.
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1.6.5 Why the Change?
Why were incumbents at an advantage prior to 1991 and at a disadvantage starting in 1991? The
available data is not sufficient to identify a single cause but does suggest a possible explanation.
The major political difference between the periods prior to 1991 and the period starting in 1991
is that in the first period, Congress could be expected to hold power in the Lok Sabha. Starting
in 1991, control of the parliament oscillated between parties potentially making experience in the
previous term less valuable. Using the structural model presented in Section II, it is possible that
the uncertainty about which party controlled the parliament caused the degree to which voters
benefited from a candidate's experience, S '(e), to fall. Making a voter's valuation of additional
experience, V'(e), negative. 19
To probe for potential causes of the disadvantage, I estimate the effects of incumbency
status on different types of incumbents. I focus on constituencies with different observable
characteristics. Specifically, constituencies are chosen conditional on whether the winner of the
first election matches the identified criteria. This requires care when interpreting the results.
The regression discontinuity approach allows me to estimate the causal relationship between the
probability of reelection and a candidate holding office prior to the election for each sub-sample.
It is not correct, however, to interpret the differences between the incumbency effects for
different subgroups as being caused by the differences in candidate characteristics. It is possible,
for example, that the opposition that candidates face could vary depending on their
characteristics. The purpose of this exercise is simply to compare average differences in the
estimate incumbency effects for various subsets of the candidates. For each sub-sample, I
estimate the incumbency effects using the spline estimator described above.
Congress candidates should be relatively more effective at working within the Congress
system. If the stability of Congress's dominance made experience valuable, then incumbents
affiliated with the Congress party should have a larger incumbency advantage than those not
affiliated with Congress. Second, starting in 1991, Candidates from all parties should fare the
19 A critical assumption in this explanation is that the graft and service effects are affected to different degrees by the
collapse of the stable political system. As Besley and Case (1995), however, make clear, voters can monitor and
hence to some degree control more public activities like setting tax rates and enacting legislation. These are
precisely the kinds of activities that would be affected by the loss of Congress's dominance. The less public
activities that derive from holding office in the constituency and that are reportedly prone to corruption, like exerting
influence in the awards of local government contracts and civil service appointments, were probably less affected.
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same since no party can be counted on to control the parliament over the next term. As Table 9
shows this is roughly what happed. Row one lists the incumbency effect for incumbents that
belong to the Congress party and the second row shows the effect for non-Congress candidates.
Before 1991, Congress incumbents enjoyed an advantage of almost twenty percent compared to
non-Congress incumbents who fared just as well as the non-incumbents that they faced. Starting
in 1991, both groups experience large disadvantages with Congress incumbents seventeen
percent less likely than their non-incumbent competitors to win an election and non-Congress
candidates ten percent less likely.
Rows three and four of Table 9 divide constituencies by whether or not Congress
dominated the constituency prior to 1991. An advantage of this approach is that, unlike in the
previous comparison, constituencies cannot change groups over time. The results are consistent
with those in rows one and two. Row three contains constituencies in which Congress won over
half of the four elections between 1977 and 1989 and row four contains the remaining
constituencies. Up to 1989, incumbents in Congress dominated constituencies enjoyed
advantages of about thirty-five percent while incumbents in other constituencies fare as well as
their non-incumbent competitors. Starting in 1991, however, all incumbents suffered a
disadvantage with those from Congress dominated constituencies fourteen percent less likely to
win an election and those from other constituencies eleven percent less likely to win.
Rows five through eight further divide the constituencies in rows one and two by the
incumbent's level of experience. Specifically, I divide the constituencies based upon whether or
not the incumbent has been an incumbent for two periods (a "serial" incumbent) or for only one
period. Referring back to equation (10), if the change in the incumbency effects were driven by
a change in S'(e) due to Congress's decline, The experience results should reflect the same
pattern as the one that exists for party membership. Prior to 1991, experienced incumbents
should outperform inexperienced incumbents and experience should be more valuable for
incumbents that belong to Congress. Starting in 1991, all the effects of incumbency should
decline and all incumbents should fare equally well. If on the other hand, the disadvantage
results from the fact that G'(e) increased because voters became more likely to expect that
candidates would divert funds to for their own benefit, then experienced candidates should fare
worse than inexperienced candidates starting in 1991.
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The results are largely consistent with those in the first four rows. Prior to 1991,
experienced incumbents outperformed inexperienced incumbents with experienced Congress
incumbents having the largest advantage (fifty-six percent compared to about eleven percent for
non-Congress incumbents). Starting in 1991, the incumbency effects for all types of incumbents
except experienced Congress incumbents declined to a six to eleven percent disadvantage.
Congress incumbents, on the other hand, fare much worse, falling to a disadvantage of twenty-
seven percent. This could reflect that, at least for incumbents affiliated with Congress, the
scandals that broke around the 1989 election made voters somewhat more suspicious of
experienced candidates, possibly reflecting an increase in G'(e).
Finally, I check a possible alternative explanation for these results. In the preceding
discussion, I have assumed that voters choose to vote for a candidate based upon value that
voters expect to derive from voting for the particular candidate. A vote for a candidate, however,
is also a vote for a party, and it is possible that voters' valuation of a candidate is dominated by
the voters' valuation of the party that the candidate represents. If this is true, then the poor
performance of non-Congress incumbents prior to 1991 could be explained by voters' general
preference for Congress, and the incumbency disadvantage that began in 1991 could simply
reflect voters' changing preferences for candidates of different parties. Elected when their party
was in favor, incumbents lost in subsequent election since voters' preferences increasingly
switched to an opposing party.
Row nine of Table 9 contains incumbents that belong to a major party that either wins an
outright majority or joins the coalition formed in the given election. Row ten on the other hand
contains only incumbents of major parties that fall from power in the given election. If the
cycling effect dominates, then incumbents in row nine should enjoy an advantage while
incumbents in row ten should suffer a disadvantage. This patter, however, is not evident in the
data. Prior to 1991, incumbents that belong to a party that is coming to power enjoy a large
advantage. This is consistent with the results in the previous rows since except for the 1989
election, this row contains primarily Congress candidates. Starting in 1991 when power
switched first to and then away from Congress, all incumbents suffer a similar disadvantage.
Those that belong to parties that are coming to power are seventeen percent less likely to win
than their non-incumbent competitors and those falling from power are twelve percent less likely
to win.
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In general, the results seem to be consistent with a model in which Congress's dominance
before 1989 provided a stable political system in which voters could expect that the experience
candidates developed while holding office would make them more valuable in future terms.
Starting in 1991, this experience became less valuable since the party that held office in a given
term could not be counted on to win the next election. The effect does not seem to be the result
of parties cycling through power, and there is some evidence that voters find experienced
Congress incumbents less valuable than inexperienced incumbents or experienced incumbents
from other parties, possibly as a result of Congress's reputation for corruption over the period in
question.
1.7 Conclusion
This study documents the surprising fact that unlike the results of studies that investigate the
effects of incumbency in the U.S. and other countries, incumbents in Indian national
parliamentary elections starting in 1991 are at a disadvantage compared to those candidates that
do not hold office prior to contesting an election. I estimate the causal effects of incumbency
using a non-parametric regression discontinuity design which relies on comparing incumbents
that are barely elected to non-incumbents that barely lose. The results indicate that in marginal
elections, incumbents are fourteen percent less likely to win an election than non-incumbents.
This is an enormous deficit. To make up such a loss, an incumbent would have to have won the
previous election by over five and a half percent of the popular vote, a change equivalent to an
incumbent moving from the first to the thirty-fifth percentile of elected officials ranked by
margin of victory.
In addition to other contexts, the disadvantage is also in contrast to results from before
the 1991 election when incumbents seem to have enjoyed advantages almost as large in
magnitude. Congress dominated the Indian national parliament prior to 1989 while afterwards
control of the parliament oscillated between political parties. Comparing subsets of
constituencies over time reveals two suggestive facts. First, the change in the effect of
incumbency seems to be concentrated in constituencies that were represented by incumbents
affiliated with the Congress party. Second, after 1989, incumbents from all parties seem to fair
equally poorly. The results are generally consistent with a model in which prior to 1991, voters
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valued the experience of incumbents because they had experience working within the Congress
system and Congress was likely to continue holding power. Starting in 1991, however, because
control of parliament was likely to change hands, experience over the previous term proved less
valuable to voters.
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Table 1: Average Characteristics of Constituencies
Constituency 1991-1999
Characteristic Marginal Non-Marginal
% Female 4.8% 4.7%
# Previous Elections Won 0.19 0.22
# Years Experience 0.59 0.73
# Previous Elections Contested 0.50 0.50
% Belong to Congress 11.0% 9.9%
% Belong to BJP 7.3% 7.6%
% Reserved for Tribes 6.9% 8A%
% Reserved for Castes 14.5% 15.3%
Number Electors 1,087,370 1,081,797
Number Voters 650,423 628,965
Number of Candidates 14.8 15.5
% of Voters Polled 60.0% 58.8%
% with margin of victory less 90.1%
than 5% at least once
1980-1989
Marginal Non-Marginal
3.1% 2.9%
0.09 0.08
0.33 0.29
0.21 0.18
13.6% 16.0%
2.2% 1.7%
6.4% 8.0%
13.8% 15.3%
771,193 726,926
488,943 436,029
9.1 8.6
63.3% 59.9%
73.2%
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Table 2: Averag Eection Rates of Candidates, 1991-199
Average Election Rates
Subset of Candidates Inc Non-inc Diff
All Candidates 37.78 0.86*** 3.92
(3.28) (0.07) (3.30)
Won or Lost by Less than 34A2** 12.46** 21.95***
15 Percent (4.04) (1.17) (4.71)
Won or Lost by Less than 21 .48** 26.91** -5.4A3
2.5 Percent (2.23) (4.32) (5.60)
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Tabe 3: Average Characteristics of Candidates, 91-1999
Candidate Al Candidates IMargin of Victoryl < 2.5*
Characteristic Inc Non4nc Diff Inc Non4nc Diff
% Female 6.9%6 3.9% 3.1% 7.8% 8.4% -0.6%
# Previous Elections Won 0.75 0.05 0.70 0.69 0.54 0.15
# Years Experience 2.62 0.19 2.44 2.38 1.81 0.57
# Previous Elections Contested 1.09 0.27 0.82 1.09 0.93 0.16
% Belong to Congress 33.2% 4.1% 29.1% 35.6% 33.1% 2.5%
%96 Belong to BJP 26.3% 3.1% 23.2% 21.9% 25.5% -3.96%
· Includes only candidates who win or lose an election by less than five percent of the popular vote
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Table 4: Incumbency Effects, 1991 to 1999
Estimates at Discontinuity
Inc Non-Inc Diff
Probabilty of Winnng
Non-Parametric
Local Linear Fit
Quartic Polynomial
No Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Spline
No Fixed Effects
18.37** 33.24**
(1.34) (1.24)
19A2** 33.71*
(3.00) (5.46)
17.39*** 36.65**
(4.57) (5.31)
20A9***
(6.77)
Fixed Effects
Continuity Checks
Female
Membership of Congress
39.7'
(6.85)
19.72** 32.05*
(2.82) (4.91)
19A.6* 31.71*
(2.65) (5.23)
7.532***
-2.012
8A42***
-1.452
34.454'** 34.845***
(4.93) (7.08)
-14.87**
(1.82)
-14.29*
(5.98)
-19.26***
(6.77)
-19.21*
(7.33)
-1 2.34**
(6.15)
-12.25*
(6.19)
-0.888
-3.071
-0.39
(5.31)
Num Previous Elections Won
Num Years MP Experience
Num Elections Contested
Probability of Rerunning
Probability of Winning
Conditional of Rerunning
59.98*** 55.98***
(4.38) (6.16)
33.23*
(4.29)
Note: Standard eviations ot point estimetes, clustered by states, in parenthesis.
MISE minimizing bandidth for Local Polynomial Regression is 6.27.
Unless otherwise stated, estimates generated using spline estlmtor.
4
(5.63)
60.3*** -27.07*
(5.88) (8.57)
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.68***
(0.09)
2.344*
(0.33)
1.063*
(0.11)
.563***
(0.06)
1.921***
(0.24)
.953**
(0.09)
0.117
(0.08)
0.423
(0.31)
0.11
(0.11)
Table 5: Sources of Bias in Estimation of Incumbency Effects
Estimates at Discontinuity
Inc NonlInc Diff
Levels of Name Matching
Entire String 16.68'** 27.83*** -11.15***
-1.75 -3.79 -3.67
Reorder and Missing Names 20.99** 31.86** -10.87'*
Exact Match Required (2.65) (3.46) (4.83)
Reorder of Names 19A6** 31.71** -12.25**
and Partial Matching (2.65) (5.23) (6.19)
Ambiguous Matches 0.27 1.83 1.36
(0.61) (1.04) (0.99)
Constituency Switching 5.84*** 3.63*** 2.21
-1.52 -1 .56 -1.3
Note: Standard deiations of point estimates, clustered by states, in parenthesis.
Estimates generated using spline estimator
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Table : Incumben Effects by Year
Year Inc NonInc Diff
1957 16A8 14.25 2.23
(10.36) (9.21) (18.08)
1962 27.65*** 10.73* 16.92**
(9.24) (6.08) (7.16)
1967 21.12** 10.08 11.04
(4.93) (4.69) (7.21)
1971 32.13** 9.79* 22.34**
(5.97) (5.88) (10.23)
1980 27.65*** 15.18* 12.47
(8.97) (8.70) (12.75)
1984 12.13* 6.2 5.93
(6.90) (8.46) (11 AB.46)
1989 16.6** 6.91* 9.75
(5.06) (3.60) (7.47)
1991 21.28 40.92*** -19.64
(8.79) (7.24) (12.09)
1996 15.32* 19.23* -3.92
(6.00) (6.50) (5.07)
1998 19.57* 27*** -7.43
(7.97) (6.00) (11.27)
1999 21.75** 38.47*** -16.71
(5A) (10.07) (14.12)
Note: Standard deviations of point estimates, clustered by states, in parenthesis.
Estimates generated using spline estimator.
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Table 7: Incumbency Effects, 1951 to 1967
Estimates at Discontinuity
Inc Non-Inc Di
Probability of Winning
Non-Parametric
Local Linear Fit
Quartic Polynomial
No Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Spline
No Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Continuity Checks*
Female
Membership of Congress
Num Previous Elections Won
Num Years MP Experience
Num Elections Contested
Probability of Rerunning
Probability of Winning
Conditional of Rerunning
23.01**
(1.25)
23.59***
(3.26)
23.66***
(5.33)
24.6***
(5.04)
24.79**'
(4.32)
26.7***
(4.17)
-2.09
(1 A.48)
53.125'**
(3.10)
-. 261***
(0.05)
-1.384**
(0.26)
-.721**
(0.10)
70.43***
(7.63)
40.3w*
(4.59)
11.95***
(1.66)
12.38*
(3.60)
12.06**
(3.57)
13
(3.87)
11**
(3.45)
12.98**
(3.48)
-0.35
(2.48)
51.21**
(3.53)
-. 289***
(0.05)
-1.54***
(0.27)
-. 743*
(0.10)
53.04**
(5.50)
24.57***
(5.87)
11.05**
(2.08)
11.22*
(5.25)
11.6
(7A2)
11.6
(7A4)
13.79**
(6.23)
13.72**
(6.21)
-1.74
(2.91)
1.914
(5.99)
0.029
(0.06)
0.156
(0.30)
0.022
(0.07)
17.39*
(9.96)
15.72*
(8.55)
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Note: Standard deviations of point estimates, clustered by states, in parenthesis.
MISE minimizing bandwidth for Local Polynomial Regression is 4.37.
Unless otherwise stated, estimates generated using spline estimtor.
Negative point estimates are the result of using an estimator that does not restrict the range to the [0,1] interval.
Table 8: Incumbency Effects 1980 to 1989
Estimates at Discontinuity 198089 less
Inc Nonnc Diff 19919
I I. _!1..IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Probability of Winning
NonParametric
Local Linear Fit
Quartic Polynomial
No Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Spline
No Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Continuity Checks
Female
Membership of Congress
Num Previous Elections Won
Num Years MP Experience
Num Elections Contested
Probability of Rerunning
Probability of Winning
Conditional of Rerunning
15.9'**
(1.37)
16.1 6**
(4.74)
14.98**
(4.30)
40.06"*
(5.04)
17.39**
(4.36)
18.62"*
(4.70)
7.54***
(2.65)
54.519***
(4.99)
.281**
(0.06)
1**
(0.20)
.246**
(0.07)
39.35***
(10.77)
35.23***
(5.16)
Note: Standard deviations of point estimates, clustered by states. in
9A*
(1 .9)
8.77*
(4.08)
5.49
(5.07)
30.31**
(6.54)
8.3***
(3.13)
9.44***
(3.11)
5.83**
(2.38)
47.792***
(7.09)
.303***
(0.06)
1.003
(0.19)
.347***
(0.07)
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(17.14)
23.85***
(5.35)
parenthesis.
MISE minimizing bandwidth for Local Polynomial Regression is 5.43.
Unless otherwise stated, estimates generated using spline estimtor.
6.44***
(2.33)
7.39
(7.14)
9.48
(6.99)
9.75
(8.17)
9.08
(5.66)
9.18
(5.78)
-21.31**
(4.15)
-21.68**
(6.28)
-28.75*
(7.21)
-29.4**
(7.61)
-21 .4A2**
(5.08)
-21 .45'
(5.09)
1.71
(3.22)
6.727
(9.74)
-0.022
(0.08)
-0.003
(0.28)
-0.101
(0.07)
13.34
(19.01)
11.38
(8.87)
-7.88
(7.98)
-42.63
(14.12)
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Table 9'ncumbency Effects by Incumbent Characteristcs
Pre4991 (1980-1989) Post-t4989 (11999) Pre'91 vs.
Sub-Division Inc Non-Inc Di Inc Non-Inc Diff post
Congress Party 25.83* 6.34* 19.49' 11.26' 284 -17.18' -36.67'
(8.72) (3.50) (10.35) (4.24) (5.36) (8.12) (10.84)
Non-Congress Party 9.3** 10.05 -0.75 24A6** 34.03*** -9.56
(4.31) (6.58) (6.72) (3.76) (5.34) (7.64)
Congress Party Held Constituency 37.28* 1.84 35.44*** 18.57** 32.96-* -14.4 -49.84
For 3 or4 Terms before 1991 (828) (2.18) (8.84) (4.89) (6.61) (8.77) (9.54)
Congress Party Held Constituency 8.33* 11.1 1** -2.77 20.29* 31.57** -11.27
For less than 3 Terms before 1991 (3.19) (4.13) (4.01) (4.62) (6.11) (7.72)
-8.5
(6.58)
Serialt Congress Party Incumbent 60.26*** 3.98 56.28** 7.93 35.27*** -27.34** -83.62**
(22.21) (8.25) (26.19) (6.88) (10.36) (13.76) (28.04)
Non-Serial Congress Party
Incumbent
Serial Non-Congress Party
Incumbent
NonSerial Non-Congress Party
Incumbent
19.42** 6.69 12.73 12.87** 23.77*** -10.9 -23.62**
(7.92) (4.17) (9.89) (4.98) (6.01) (8.95) (10.10)
8.24* -2A4 10.68 30.73" 36.56*** -5.84 -16.52
(4.62) (2.58) (5.35) (9.00) (7.70) (13.01) (13.38)
10.42* 13.61 -3.19 22.78*** 33.17 -10.39
(5.78) (8626) (8.02) (4.07) (6.13) (798)
-7.2
(9.99)
Incumbent Belongs to
Party Coming to Power
21 .35"* 3.86
(5.02) (3.14)
17.5** 14.3'** 30.92*** -16.61* -34.11"*
(6.46) (4A6) (7.31) (9.34) (9.63)
Incumbent Belongs to 17.39** 8.3*** 9.06
Part Falling from Power (4.36) (3.13) (5.66)
Notec Standard deviations of point estimates, clustered by states. in parenthesis.
Estimates generated using spline estimator.
T Serial incumbents refers to incumbents that hold office for two terms prior to an election
19.72 32.05** -12.34* -21A2**
(2.82) (4.91) (6.15) (5.08)
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-8.81
(8.84)
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Chapter 2: Could Have Been a Contender?
The Effects of Limiting the Number of Candidates in
Indian State Parliamentary Elections
2.1 Introduction
It is hard to overemphasize the importance of competition in the democratic process. For voters,
it provides a range of policy options from which to choose. It gives other candidates an incentive
to articulate their positions and inform voters about the differences in their respective platforms.
And once in office, the knowledge that the official will face competition in the next election
provides an incentive to take actions that are in the interests of voters while in office.
The difficult question, however, is to determine what constitutes political competition.
Candidates that have a significant chance of winning an election undoubtedly provide
meaningful competition, but candidates do not have to win to influence an election. Washington
(2003), for example, provides evidence that just the existence of an African American candidate
causes existing congressional members to vote more conservatively.
The theoretical literature describing how democratic electoral processes relate to a
candidate's behavior in office emphasizes that the just the opportunity of being able to vote for
other candidates, even if not exercised, can influence the behavior of public officials. Most
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models use the standard moral hazard (Austin-Smith and Banks, 1989) and adverse selection
models (Banks and Sundaram, 1993) to reconcile the large advantages that incumbents posses
with the fact that incumbents do seem responsive to the electoral process. In all of these models,
incumbents take observable actions that are in the interests of voters because, within voters'
equilibrium strategies, these actions allow the incumbents to increase their probability of re-
election. Implicit in these models, however, is the idea that voters do choose who they would
prefer to be in office. Furthermore, the choice to retain an incumbent is a choice in which the
benefits of providing incentives to elected officials trades off with the opportunity cost of
forgoing the election of other candidates.
In this body of research, two relationships shape the incentives of incumbents. First,
voters must act such that proper action on the part of the incumbent increases the probability of
election. Providing a "carrot" for proper action, however, is meaningless without a "stick" in
hand to punish deviations from the equilibrium strategy. So, it is also necessary that the same
voters can credibly commit to punishing the incumbents for non-action by choosing another
candidate if incumbents choose to take actions that are not in the interests of voters. The more
valuable the opportunity cost of not electing another candidate, the stronger the incentives that
voters can provide to incumbents.
The first relationship has received a fair amount of empirical attention. For example,
Besley and Case (1995), Case (2001), Chattopadhyay and Dulfo (2003), Miguel and Zaidi
(2003), and Pande (2003), all demonstrate that electing a specific candidate increases the flow of
resources to the candidate's constituents. This paper, on the other hand, relates to the second
question. By asking whether a change in election laws that reduces the number of candidates
changes the probability of electing existing candidates, I ask whether or not these candidates
provide opportunities to voters that they would not have if restricted to existing candidates.
Based upon the existing theory, the question implicitly determines also whether or not these
candidates serve a role in setting the incentives of candidates during the election and when in
office.
More importantly, however, empirically investigating this relationship also sheds light on
the more subtle question of whether additional candidates can constitute political competition
and the effects of laws that attempt to limit competition to "viable" candidates. This simple
question has profound implications for the design of electoral systems because, by necessity,
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democracies limit the number of candidates in order to control the cost of providing elections. In
the U.S. for example, some consider the existence of only two political parties (and the resulting
fact that most elections only have two viable candidates) to suggest a system plagued by a lack
of competition that strongly favors incumbent candidates. In short, voters can not properly
discipline incumbents because they have almost no one else to elect. This has motivated some
observers to argue that requirements for listing candidates on state and national ballots should be
relaxed to allow additional, though weaker, candidates to participate.
Compared to the U.S., India seems the opposite. The dizzying number of political parties
and independent candidates at both the state and national levels suggest not a dearth but an
excess of competition. Such an extraordinary number of people contesting for the relatively
limited number of elected offices have caused many to wonder if these candidates actually have
a role in the electoral process or are simply taking advantage of a public forum for reasons
unrelated to the potential of being elected to office. After the most recent national election, for
example, the commission in charge of Indian elections concluded that of the 5,435 candidates
contesting at the national level, only 4,190 were serious contenders (NewKerala.com, 2004).
I focus on the degree to which the number of new candidates in a constituency affects the
probability that existing candidates win office in Indian state parliamentary elections.
Unfortunately, the causal relationship between the number of candidates and the probability of
election is particularly difficult to estimate because the relationship is potentially endogenous.
First, while additional candidates may make existing candidates less likely to be elected,
constituencies where existing potential candidates are weak are also likely to attract many new
competitors. So, even an inverse relationship between the number of new candidates and the
probability of election would be ambiguous.
The relationship can also, however, work in the opposite direction. There is a significant
amount of serial correlation in the number of candidates that contest an election in a given Indian
constituency, meaning that a constituency that experiences an increase in the number of new
candidates in one period will have a large number of new candidates in the next. If providing
voters with more candidates from which to choose yields strong incumbents, then incumbents
from constituencies that on average have large numbers of new candidates may also have higher
rates of re-election than incumbents from constituencies with lower levels of competition.
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My identification strategy utilizes a change in the Indian election laws enacted after the
1996 national election in response to the ever growing length of ballots in state and national
parliamentary elections. The reforms made it more difficult for a candidate to contest an election
by increasing the requirements for being nominated and by doubling the size of the deposit that
candidates must risk when running for office.20 These changes significantly reduced the number
of candidates running for office after 1996 and had differing effects across constituencies
depending on the prior level of competition. As one would expect, constituencies with the
largest average number of candidates experienced the largest drop in the number of candidates
contesting, providing exogenous variation in the number of new candidates both over time and
between constituencies.
The results suggest that the number of new candidates have a measurable effect on the
probability that existing candidates win office. On average, the addition of one new candidate
reduces the probability that an existing candidate wins by three fourths of a percent. The
probability of the average existing candidate winning falls by three hundredths of a percentage
point from a baseline probability of four percentage points. This suggests that the change in
electoral laws that decreased the number of new candidates in each constituency by an average
of six candidates, increased the electoral prospects of the average existing candidate by 4.5
percent or two tenths of a percentage point. There is, however evidence of heterogeneity in the
impact of the law on existing candidates, suggesting that the law could have impacted particular
types of candidates more severely.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section II describes both
the state parliamentary system in India and the change in the electoral rules in 1996. Section III,
outlines the data used in the analysis, and Section IV describes the general empirical strategy.
Section V provides the empirical results, and the paper concludes with section VI.
20 Indian election rules require candidates to post a deposit when running for office. The deposit is only returned to
a candidate if the candidate either wins the election or captures at least a sixth of the popular vote. The rule is
design to deter individuals with no hope of winning election from running.
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2.2 Indian State Elections and the 1996 Rule Change
2.2.1 The Role of the Vidhan Sabha
The Indian constitution provides for a federalist system much like the system in the U.S. - made
up of national and state level representative bodies - but with a stronger center. Each state and
two union territories (Pondicherry and the National Capital Territory of Delhi) have one directly
elected house of parliament that mirrors the lower house of parliament at the national level, the
Lok Sabha. These bodies are known as the Vidhan Sabhas or legislative assemblies, and their
members are referred to as a Member of the Legislative Assembly or MLA. Some states also
have unelected upper parliament similar to the Rajya Sabha at the national level.
As in most federalist systems, the relationship between the center (or national
government) and India's has 32 state and union territories is often precarious. Unlike the U.S.,
however, the framers of the Indian constitution deliberately tipped the balance in the favor of the
central government. The Indian constitution explicitly enumerates three lists of subjects upon
which the center, the state, and both bodies can legislate, but the state parliaments must defer to
the center on shared subjects and the center can legislate on matters reserved for the states as
long as the measure receives the support of two-thirds of the national upper house of parliament.
The autonomy of the state parliaments is thus limited relative to the national parliament, but the
state parliaments do still play a crucial roll in the governance of Indian voters.
2.2.2 The Election of State Representatives
State parliamentary elections must occur either every five years or when the current state
government loses majority control. Once called, the election is scheduled and run by the
independent Election Commission of India. The commission runs all national and state
parliamentary elections as well as the election of the President and Vice-President. The
commission comprises three individuals: two Election Commissioners and the Chief Election
Commissioner who can only be removed from office by parliamentary impeachment. In addition
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to running the elections, the commission also maintains the polling records that identify who can
and can not vote in a given election.
The election itself follows the same first-past-the-post system as the elections to the
national parliament. After all votes are cast, the candidate with the largest percentage of the vote
(regardless of the magnitude of the fraction) wins the election. Votes are cast by secret ballot,
and anyone over the age of 18 is allowed to vote (21 before 1989). To ensure accessibility, the
ECI tries to locate polling stations so that no elector is more than 2km away from the nearest
polling station and so that no station has to serve more than 1,500 voters. Finally, the election
itself is usually spread over several days due to the sheer number of people and geographic
distances involved.
Anyone over the age of 25 can contest a parliamentary election for the state in which they
are a resident. Candidates must be nominated by one registered elector if standing from a
registered political party21 or ten registered electors if standing as an independent or member of
an un-registered party. Finally, candidates must also post a bond, called the "deposit", when
contesting. The candidate forfeits the deposit if they do not receive more than a sixth of the
votes cast.
2.2.3 Change in Election Laws in 1996
Indian elections attract a surprisingly large number of political parties and candidates. Indian
elections have always been relatively large. In the 1980's, most states had an average number of
between 4 and 6 candidates per state. These average grew with each subsequent until in the early
1990's four states averaged over ten candidates a constituency. The most extreme example
occurred in Tamil Nadu where in 1996, 1033 candidates contested the same parliamentary seat in
Modakurichi.
Since many of these candidates were considered potentially frivolous and because the'
size of the ballot created administrative difficulties, the electoral rules were changed in August of
21 Candidates can contest as an independent or as a member of a political party. In India, political parties are
officially recognized as national or state level registered parties if they have performed sufficiently well in the last
election. This recognition is critical because candidates are identified on a ballot by the largely illiterate population
by symbols rather than the candidates' names. State parties are allowed to reserve a single symbol for use across the
state and national parties have exclusive use of their symbol across the entire country. The allocation of all other
symbols varies by constituency.
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1996 after the 1996 general election. The number of people that must nominate candidates from
non-registered parties was increased, but more importantly the size of the deposit, which is
forfeited by weak candidates, was also increased. Before the law, candidates were required to
deposit 500 Rupees ($US 10) to contest national elections and 250 Rupees for state elections.
The law increased the sums to 10,000 Rupees and 5,000 Rupees respectively. Individuals
contesting from constituencies in which representation is reserved for members of scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes pay half of the amount required of regular candidates (both before
and after the rule change). Despite this change, many still feel that too many candidates contest
the elections.
2.3 Data
The data for this paper were acquired from the Election Commission of India. The ECI is
responsible for holding all parliamentary elections in India, and after each election, provides an
official report listing summary statistics on the campaigns for each state and national
constituency as well as the actual results for each candidate in the campaign. These data include
the name of each candidate, the candidate's gender, the candidate's political party, and the
number of votes that the candidate received.
The political boundaries for both the state and national parliaments were set in 1973 by a
special delimitation commission such that each state was represented in proportion to their share
of the national population. These constituency definitions where then frozen in 1976 by
constitutional amendment to avoid providing a disincentive for state implementation of family
planning measures. The new constituency definitions will be redrawn by the current delimitation
commission based upon the results of the most recent decennial census. Despite this general
policy, some state level constituencies did change between 1977 and the present. Most notably,
Uttar Pradesh completely changed constituencies for the state's last election in 2002, and the
configurations of constituencies in Arunachal Pradesh and Goa changed in 1990 and 1989
respectively. Finally, a small number of constituencies do not report results in particular years.
The ECI maintains and releases the election data primarily to ensure transparency and
accountability in the electoral process, and the organization and quality of the data are quite
remarkable. From the perspective of this study, however, the major short coming of the
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available data is the inability to track the performance of candidates over time. The spelling of
names, in most cases, is a transliteration from other Indian languages which generates variation
in spelling of the same name from one election to the next. In addition, however, there is very
little consistency in the reporting of name formats. When comparing the name given to the same
candidate in various elections, the commission reports names in various orders, drops first or
middle names entirely, and inconsistently reports various modifiers like the candidate's father,
occupation, or other modifiers that the candidate associates with his or her name.
The solution employed in this paper is to use the same algorithm employed by Linden
(2004). The algorithm seeks to match candidates over time within a given constituency. For a
given constituency, the algorithm iterates through decreasing levels of specificity, searching
through the names of candidates contesting an election in each year and matching the names
across each election. The criteria for a match begin with exact matches between the names
provided by the ECI. The algorithm then allows omitted or mis-ordered names, inaccurate
division of names, and finally spelling differences of a character or less.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 General Approach
The goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of changes in the level of competition on the
electability of candidates using the change in election laws in 1996 to provide exogenous
variation in the number of candidates. Using a common strategy, I take the set of candidates in
the election prior to the election of interest as the basis of observation. So, if the election of
interest is in period t, then I use the election at period t-l to identify a pool of existing candidates,
and measure their probability of winning the election in period t as a function of the number of
new candidates appearing in period t.
This strategy allows both for the identification of a set of likely candidates before the
change in election laws in 1996 and allows for the use of the first period election results to
control for the strength of each candidate in the election of interest. The disadvantage is that it is
impossible to identify only candidates who intend to run in the subsequent election. While part
of this decision is certainly determined by the number of new candidates likely to enter in the
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subsequent period, the inclusion of candidates with no intention of running in the subsequent
period will bias the estimated effect of new candidates towards zero.
The potential endogeneity problems with this strategy are also clear. I propose to test an
inverse relationship between the probability of winning the election in period t by a candidate
from the election in period t-l and the number of new candidates in period t. However, strong
candidates in the prior period are likely to deter potential new candidates from entering an
election, generating the same inverse relationship. Conversely, the relationship could also be
direct. For example, it is possible that constituencies that have large numbers of candidates in
elections produce strong candidates that are likely to win subsequent elections.
My solution is to use the change in electoral laws in 1996 to identify exogenous variation
in the number of new candidates contesting. Figure 1 displays the average number of new
candidates per constituency for the five largest states in the data set. The elections are ordered
relative to 1996 so that the election in period 0 is the last election in the specified state to operate
under the old deposit requirements, and the election in period -1 is the first election after the new
deposit requirements. The change in election rules not only significantly reduced the number of
new candidates contesting in the last election, but they also reversed a strong trend towards
larger elections, suggesting that the laws in fact did constrain the number of new candidates
contesting in the last election.
Figures 2 and 3 provide grater detail on the effects of the change in election laws. Figure
2 displays the distribution of constituencies by the number of new candidates for the election just
prior to and just after the 1996 election laws. After the election laws, not a single constituency
has more than 25 new candidates and the majority of constituencies have between zero and seven
new candidates. Figure 3 demonstrates that the magnitude of the change in the number of new
candidates is not uniformly distributed but rather varies inversely with the average number of
candidates in each constituency before the change in the law. The constituencies that
experienced the largest declines in the number of new candidates were the constituencies that, on
average, had the largest number of candidates.
The problem with using a single uniform change in the laws is that it is difficult to isolate
the changes in the electoral process caused by the change in the law from other factors that
change over time. In Figure 1, for example, the elections in period 3 have about the same
number of new candidates as the election after the change in electoral laws. Even controlling for
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the number of new candidates, however, the probability of candidates being elected is different
because the political climate changed significantly in intervening 15-20 years. In fact, a very
significant rupture occurs at the national level between 1989 and 1991 after the Congress party
loses for the first time to a disparate opposition and incumbency changes from a political asset to
a liability (Linden, 2004).
To ensure both comparability between elections before and after the change in election
laws and robustness of the empirical results, I use two sets of election in the following analysis.
First, I use the election just before and just after the change, and second, I use the first and last
two elections after and before the change to check robustness. Since there are so few states with
a second election after the change in the election laws, the second set primarily adds a second
group of elections before the change in election laws. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of
the variables used in the following statistical analysis.
2.4.2 Model
I employ the following basic model:
y = +f(NewCands) + 'Xuis + ss
Yya, is a dummy variable for whether or not candidate i won the election in period t, state j,
and constituency k. usik is a random disturbance term, and X is a set of control variables.
The set of control variables always contains a dummy for the gender of the candidate and a cubic
polynomial of the margin of victory. The cubic polynomial is motivated by Figure 4 which
provides a graph of the relationship between the probability of election and the margin of victory
allowing for a discontinuity at zero due to incumbency effects. Over this period, the average
incumbency effect is relatively small and the entire relationship can be well approximated with a
cubic polynomial. The estimated standard errors for all coefficients are clustered at the
constituency level.
The difference between the individual specifications is simply the variables that I use to
instrument for the number of new candidates and then the control variables that I use to isolate
the effects of those candidates. The goal is to test the robustness of the estimates of the effect of
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changes in the number of new candidates using different types of variation surrounding the
change in the election laws in 1996. I use four specifications in what follows:
1. OLS: An Ordinary Least Squares estimate of the relationship between the probability of
election of existing candidates and the number of new candidates.
2. IV1: Uses a dummy variable for the period after the change in deposit levels as an
instrument for the number of new candidates.
3. IV2: Uses the interaction between a dummy variable for the period after the change and
the average number of total candidates in each constituency before the change in election
laws.
4. IV3: Uses both the average number of candidates before the change in laws and the
interaction of the average with a dummy variable for the period after the change in
electoral laws.
The results of each of the instrumental variable specifications are consistent. For the average
existing candidate, an additional new candidate reduces the probability of election by about a
half a percent.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 OLS Estimates
Table 2 contains the ordinary least squares estimates of the relationship between the probability
of election and the number of new candidates. The first two columns contain estimates using
only the first election before and after the change in the deposit requirements while the last two
are estimated using two elections before and after the change. The estimates are very consistent
in demonstrating a negative correlation between the probability of winning the election and the
number of new candidates. On average, one additional new candidate decreases the probability
of existing candidates winning the election by about two hundredths of a percentage point.
Taking the curvature of the relationship into account with the quadratic specification suggests
that the impact of additional candidates declines in the number of new candidates with the first
new candidate reducing the probability of victory by eight hundredths of a percent. The implied
effect is small, but not negligible since the probability of an existing candidate winning election
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is only four percent points. So, in the linear specification, each candidate changes the relative
probability of election by a half a percent, and, in the quadratic specification, the impact of the
first new candidate is two percent.
2.5.2 First Stage Regressions
To control for the potential endogeneity of the posited relationship, I use the exogenous variation
generated by the change in the election laws in 1996. Table 3 contains the results of the first
stage regressions for the subsequent instrumental variables estimates. Again, the first two
columns contain estimates for the first election before and after the change in the law, and the
second column adds the second elections before and after the change. Both pairs of estimates,
however, show roughly the same relationship with the magnitude of the coefficients in the
second pairs slightly smaller than the first. Columns one and three confirm the relationship
displayed in Figure 1 - after the change in the deposit requirements, five and a half less new
candidates contest the average election. Adding the elections two years out reduces this
difference by over a candidate since the election just prior to 1996 was usually the largest.
As Figure 3 demonstrates, the effects of the change in electoral rules is not uniform, but
rather is more significant in constituencies that, on average, had larger numbers of candidates
prior to the change in laws. Columns two and four quantify this relationship. Constituencies
that, on average, have one more candidate before the rule change experience about one less new
candidate after the change in laws. This is consistent with the fact that these constituencies
contain more candidates on average that will fail to obtain at least a sixth of the popular vote and
will loose their deposits.
2.5.3 Variation Over Time
The first instrumental variables specification (IV 1) uses a dummy variable for the period after
the election as an instrument. The effect of this specification is to use only the portion of the
variation in the number of new candidates that is correlated with the average number of new
candidates before or after the rule change. Specifically, it only uses changes in the average
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number of new candidates over time to estimate the causal relationship between the number of
new candidates and an existing candidate's probability of election.
Table 4 contains the results for this specification. Columns 1 and 3 contains the reduced
form estimates for one and two elections before and after the change in election laws
respectively. The average probability of election by existing candidates increases by three tenths
of a percentage point after the change in election laws using both data sets. Columns 2 and 4
contain the IV estimates using the dummy variable to instrument for the number of new
candidates. The implied effects are about 50 percent larger than the effects generated by the
OLS correlation, but still very consistent.
2.5.4 Differences between Constituencies
There are two disadvantages to the preceding specification. First, it does not allow for an
estimate of more than a linear function of the number of new candidates. Second, it does not
control for possible year effects in the changes in the probability of existing candidates winning
office. If this probability increased (decreased) for a reason unrelated to the changes in the
number of new candidates, then this specification will attribute the change to the number of new
candidates, over (under) estimating the coefficient on the number of new candidates.
To check for changes in the probability of election not caused by changes in the number
of new candidates, I use the fact that the election laws had larger effects in constituencies with
larger numbers of average candidates. This variation in the effects of the law allows for the use
of between constituency variation in the number of new candidates rather than the average
effects of the law over time. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the reduced form regressions. While
not statistically significant, candidates in constituencies that average more candidates before the
change in election laws have higher rates of election afterwards.
Columns 2 through 4 contain the results of specifications that use only between
constituency variation after the change in election laws. In these specifications, the interaction
between the dummy variable for the period after the change in deposit requirements and the
average number of candidates is used as an instrument for the number of new candidates. To
control for baseline levels of new candidates' electability, I include the average number of
candidates in the second stage regression. Mathematically, this instrumentation strategy only
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uses the variation in the number of new candidates that both occurs after the change in election
laws and is correlated with the average number of candidates in the constituency before the
change in election laws. While this allows one to control for changes in the level of electability,
the exclusion restrictions are more severe. In addition to accepting the exogeneity of the change
in the election laws, we must also accept that the variation in the number of candidates correlated
with the average number of candidates before the change is determined by the change in the
electoral laws rather than the strength of the existing candidates in a given location.
The results across all specifications are consistent. Column 2 estimates the relationship
using both the dummy for after the legal change and the average number of candidates as control
variables in the second stage regression. While the coefficient cannot be statistically
distinguished from zero, the point estimate is that a change in the number of new candidates
reduces the probability of existing candidates being elected by three hundredths of a percent -
identical to the estimate using only the average variation in the number of candidates over time.
Absent the change in the number of new candidates, however, there does not seem to have been
much change in the probability of existing candidates being elected - the coefficient on "After
1996" is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This allows us to improve the
precision of the estimated coefficient on the number of new candidates by using the dummy
variable as an instrument. Column 3 contains these results. While this increases the level of
variation in the number of candidates by including the average number before and after the legal
change, the estimate of the coefficient is identical to that in column 2 but now is statistically
significant at the one percent level. Column 4 contains the estimate of the quadratic relationship.
While the coefficient suggests the same declining effect of the number of candidates over time as
the estimates in Table 2, the magnitude of the linear component is much smaller and consistent
with the estimates of the linear specification. However, the coefficients on neither the linear nor
the quadratic terms are statistically significant.
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 present the results of regressions using both the average
number of candidates and the interaction with the period after 1996 dummy variable as
instruments. These are identical to the estimations in columns 2 through 4 except that the
average number of candidates is used as an instrument rather than as a control variable.
Although the exclusion restrictions on this specification are severe - requiring one to accept that
all variation in the number of new candidates correlated with the average number of candidates
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before the change in the law is unrelated to the strength of individual candidates - the point
estimates are consistent with the previous estimates of the effects of additional new candidates.
2.5.5 Effect of the Number of Original Candidates
In the regression results presented above, I have implicitly assumed that the margin of victory
has controlled for the strength of existing candidates. This is critical because otherwise the fact
that the number of candidates is correlated over time will mechanically generated an inverse
relationship between the probability of an existing candidate being elected and the number of
new candidates that cannot be excluded using the previous instrumentation strategy. The
problem is that only one candidate from each constituency can be elected to office. If one
candidate wins, the other candidates necessarily lose. More candidates in a constituency force
more candidates to lose, generating a negative correlation between the number of candidates in a
constituency and the probability of a candidate winning election.
To check this, I estimate the results of the original ordinary least squares and the main
two instrumental variables regressions using only the top five candidates in an election for the
elections just before and after the change in election laws. Because this fixes the number of
existing candidates per constituency, it eliminates the mechanical relationship described above
from generating the observed inverse relationship. However, because there is a significant
correlation between the rank of an original candidate and the probability of winning the next
election, these candidates have a higher baseline probability of winning the next election, and
may be more affected by the number of new candidates.
Table 6 contains the re-estimation of the model using the four basic specifications for the
elections directly before and after the change in election laws. The estimated coefficients of the
instrumental variables regressions are consistent with each other, estimating that the addition of
one new candidate reduces the probability of one of the top existing candidates from winning by
about seven to eight percent. As with the estimates using all of the candidates, these estimates
are about twice the size of the OLS estimate of the model. Rather than reflecting the mechanical
correlation that motivated the estimations, however, the larger coefficients suggest heterogeneity
in the effects of the new candidates that is correlated with the strength of the existing candidates.
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2.6 Conclusion
All of the estimates suggest that the addition of additional candidates for Indian state
parliamentary elections had a very small effect on the electability of the average existing
candidate. The addition of a new candidate reduces the probability that an existing candidate
wins office by only three fourths of a percent. The probability of election falls from about four
percentage points to only 3.7 percent. This suggests that the increase in deposit requirements
had almost no effect on the average existing candidate. On average, the number of new
candidates fell by about six candidates per constituency, increasing the probability of the average
candidate being elected by only 0.18 percentage points.
The appropriate level of restrictions on candidates depends not only on the probability
that the excluded candidates have an effect on the election but also the cost of allowing them to
contest and the magnitude of the benefits derived from their small effects. These results suggest
that without significant social benefits, however, relatively small administrative costs would
justify the additional restrictions imposed in 1996. These results, however, consider only the
effects on the average candidates. They also suggest that the impact of new candidates may be
larger for stronger existing candidates. This means that, while not affecting the average existing
candidates, new candidates could have larger impacts on specific groups of candidates.
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Chapter 3: Remedying Education:
Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India
3.1 Introduction
There has been a lot of interest recently in the question of how to effectively deliver education to
the poor in developing countries and a corresponding burgeoning of high quality research on the
subject. A lot of the research focuses on the effects of reducing the cost of schooling, with the
view that the important goal is to get the children into school. Examples of this kind of work
include Banerjee, Jacob and Kremer (2002) on school meals in India, Duflo (2001) on school
construction in Indonesia, Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (1997) on school uniforms in Kenya,
Spohr (1999) on compulsory schooling laws in Taiwan and Vermeersch (2002) on school meals
for preschoolers in Kenya. The primary metric by which success is judged in these studies is
attendance, and in each of these cases a significant impact was found.
Are students also learning measurably more as a result of these interventions? There is no
obvious reason why they would. The influx of new students probably makes learning harder for
the children who were already in school, simply because there are more demands on existing
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resources.2 2 And while the newcomers will presumably learn more, just by the fact that they are
now attending school, it is not clear that there is anyone with whom we could compare them.
At the other extreme are interventions that focus directly on improving test scores for
students who are already in school. These are interventions where students are explicitly
rewarded for doing well on tests: Angrist, et. al., (2002) study a program in Colombia that offers
private school vouchers to students who keep their scores above a certain level. A recent study
by Kremer, Miguel and Thornton (2002) looks at the impact of offering scholarships to students
in Kenya who do well on a standardized test. Both studies find an impact on test scores, though
in such cases the existence of an impact is perhaps less interesting than whether the gains are
commensurate with the money spent.
Perhaps the most interesting case is the one in between: Interventions that purport to
improve the quality of the learning experience, but for which no evidence exists that they
actually do improve learning. Examples include increasing the teacher-student ratio (Banerjee,
Jacob and Kremer, 2002), subsidized textbooks (Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin, 1997), free flip-
charts (Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewitz, 1997); and then the interventions that improve
the health of school children (for example, deworming, as in Kremer and Miguel, 2002),
incentives for teachers (Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin, 2002), and blackboards and other school
inputs (Chin, 2001), etc. By improving school quality, these programs can increase attendance.
One ought also to expect an improvement in test scores among those who were already in school.
Nevertheless, it is notable that relatively few of the studies from developing countries report a
positive impact on test scores for those who were already in school.23 Moreover, one cannot rule
out the idea that there is no impact on children's educational achievement a priori, because the
quality of teaching in many schools leaves much to be desired. Or it could even be the case that
the children do not learn because they do not want to: The returns are just not high enough.
22 Indeed this is what Banerjee, Jacob and Kremer (2002) find for mid-day meals, and Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin
(1997) find for a program that offered both free textbooks and free school uniforms.
23 The one exception we of we are aware is the study of a program that provides incentives for teachers in Kenya
that is reported in Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin (2002b), though even in this case the authors seem to be somewhat
disappointed by the lack of a more robust impact. Chin (2001) finds that Operation Blackboard in India did increase
school completion rates for girls, which implies that there must have been an increase in test scores, but she cannot
tell whether those who would have completed school in any case learn more as a result of the intervention.
Vermeersch (2002) also finds an impact on test scores of a school meals program in schools where the teachers were
trained, but she too cannot distinguish between those who were already in school and the newcomers.
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This paper reports on a randomized evaluation of an intervention in urban India focused
on improving the learning environment in public schools. The intervention is motivated by the
belief that children often drop out because they fall behind and feel lost in class. The program,
which is run Pratham, a Mumbai-based Non-Governmental Organization, provides remedial
education, in small groups, to children that are lagging behind. To keep costs low and ensure a
good instructor-student relationship, the program hires young women (the "Balsakhis") who
have the equivalent of a high school degree from the local slum communities in which the
schools are located.
The evaluation of the remedial education (Balsakhi) program offered an opportunity to
implement an evaluation design that is often recommended but rarely, if ever, utilised.24 First, it
was a randomized evaluation. We can therefore be relatively confident of the absence of
confounding factors.2 5 Second, the program we study was run on a very large-scale (over 15,000
students were included in the study), and had already clearly demonstrated the ability to scale up
in other cities, as the description below will make clear. In other words, there is no risk that what
we are evaluating cannot be reproduced elsewhere. Third, we simultaneously carried out
randomized evaluations of the program in two different cities, each of which had its own
management team. This reinforces our confidence in the external validity of these results.
Finally, we conducted the study over two years, using several tests, making it less likely that the
results are a consequence of the newness of the program, or the effect of implementing an
evaluation.
Finally, though we find no effect on attendance, we find that the program has a
substantial positive effect on children's academic achievement. This impact is remarkably stable
across years and cities, especially when we take into account the instability of the environment---
there was a major riot and a catastrophic earthquake while the program was running. Moreover,
the weaker students, who are the primary target of the program, gained the most. This study
demonstrates both the efficacy of the remedial education program, and more generally, the
feasibility of dramatically impacting test scores at very low cost. We also make an attempt to
24 We are currently in the middle of a two-year evaluation of a Computer Assisted Learning program in Baroda
whose research design is very similar to the one described here. However, we are unaware of any other evaluation of
an educational program that meets the criteria listed below.
25 In Baroda, the Computer Aided Learning (CAL) program was implemented in the second year of the Balaskhi
study, for fourth standard children only. However, the experimental design randomly assigned the CALprogram to
half of the balsakhi-treatment and half of the balsakhi-comparison schools, thus allowing us to estimate unbiased
balsakhi-only effects. The results of the CAL program will be reported once the study is complete.
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distinguish the direct effect of the program (on children who worked with the balsakhi) and the
indirect (on those who did not). The estimates suggest that the reducing class size by hiring a
balsakhi is at least twice as effective as reducing class size by keeping children with regular
teachers.
3.2 The Balsakhi Program
Pratham was established in Mumbai in 1994, with support from UNICEF, and has since
expanded to several other cities in India. Pratham now reaches over 220,000 children in 34 cities
in India, and employs about 10,000 individuals. Pratham works closely with the government:
Most of its programs are conducted in the municipal schools, and Pratham also provides
technical assistance to the government.
One of Pratham's core programs is a remedial education program, called the Balsakhi
program. This program, in place in many municipal schools, provides a teacher (usually a young
woman, recruited from the local community, who has herself finished secondary school) to work
with children identified as falling behind their peers. While the exact details vary according to
local conditions, the typical instructor meets with a group of approximately 15-20 children in the
morning for two hours, and with another group of the same size in the afternoon. Instruction
focuses on the core competencies the children should have learned in the second and third
standards, primarily basic numeracy and literacy skills. The instructors are provided with a
standardized curriculum that was developed by Pratham. They receive two weeks of training at
the beginning of the year and ongoing reinforcement while school is in session. The program has
been implemented in twenty Indian cities, reaching tens of thousands of students. It was started
in Mumbai in 1994, and expanded to Vadodara in 1999.
According to Pratham, the main benefit of the program is to provide individualized, non-
threatening attention to children who are lagging behind in the classroom and are not capable of
following the standard curriculum. Children may feel more comfortable with women from their
own communities than teachers, who are often from different backgrounds. As the balsakhi's
class size is relatively small, she may tailor the curriculum to the children's specific needs.
Furthermore, because Pratham's program takes children out of the classroom, it may even benefit
children who were not directly targeted by the intervention. Removing children from the
92
classroom for two hours means the effective student-teacher ratio in the main classroom drops,
and the teacher may be able to focus on more advanced material. Finally, if the balsakhis are
indeed effective, even when the children are returned to the main classroom, the teacher may not
need to keep re-teaching remedial material.
An important characteristic of this program is the ease which with it can be scaled up.
Because Pratham relies on local personnel, trained for a short period of time, the program is very
low-cost (each teacher is paid 500-750 rupees, or 10-15 dollars, per month) and is easily
replicated. There is rapid turnover among the balsakhis (each of them staying for an average of
one year, typically until they get married or get another job), indicating that the success of the
program does not depend on a handful of very determined and enthusiastic individuals. Finally,
since the balsakhis use whatever space is available (free classrooms, or even hallways when
necessary), the program has very low overhead and capital costs.
3.3 Evaluation Design
3.3.1 Sample: Vadodara
In 2000, when Pratham decided to expand their remedial education (balsakhi) program to cover
the entire city of Vadodara, they decided to take advantage of the expansion to evaluate the
effectiveness of the program in the remaining 98 eligible schools in the city. In November, 2000,
they administered an academic test (designed by the Pratham team) to all children in the third
standard. They then hired and trained balsakhis, which were sent to half of the schools in
Vadodara. Assignment was random, with schools stratified by medium of instruction, gender,
and pupil-teacher ratios. Unfortunately, the school year was disrupted by an earthquake in
Gujarat, and children received only a few weeks of instruction between November and March.
This year of the program is best understood as a pilot program.26
In July, 2001, the group of schools that had received a balsakhi in the previous year of the
program received the balsakhi in the fourth standard, and the remaining schools received a
26 Throughout the paper, we will refer to the year 2001-2002 as "year 1" and 2002-2003 as "year 2."
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balsakhi in the third standard. Children in the standard that did not receive the balsakhi in a given
grade form the comparison group for children who did receive the balsakhi.
The program was continued during the school year 2002-2003, with the addition of the
25 remaining primary schools. Schools where the balsakhi was assigned in standard three in the
year 2001-2002 were now assigned a balsakhi in standard four, so that in year 2, standard 4
children in the treatment group benefitted from two years of the balsakhi program. Schools
where the balsakhi was assigned in standard four in the year 1 received balsakhi assistance for
standard three in year 2. The new schools were randomly assigned to either group with equal
probability in the same way that the original schools were assigned. The number of schools and
divisions in the two groups are given in Table 1.
3.3.2 Sample: Mumbai
To ensure the results from the Vadodara study would be generalizable, the Balsakhi program in
Mumbai was also evaluated, in 2001-2002 and 2002-2003. Mumbai was Pratham's birthplace,
and Pratham is currently operating various programs throughout the city. We selected one ward
(the L-ward) to implement a design similar to the design in Vadodara, including all Gujarati,
Hindi, and Marathi schools. In total, 62 schools are included in the study. Schools were stratified
according to their scores in a pre-test, as well as by the medium of instruction. Half the schools
were randomly selected to receive a balsakhi in standard two, and half the schools were
randomly selected to receive a balsakhi in standard three. In 2001-2002, data were collected only
for standard three children, while in 2002-2003, data were collected for standards three and four.
As in Vadodara, children kept their treatment assignment status as the moved from standard two
to three (or three to four).
In the second year of the study, the Mumbai program experienced some administrative
difficulties. A decision to require balsakhis to pass a competency test resulted in the firing of
many balsakhis. Hiring new recruits was complicated by the fact that the administrative staff in
L-Ward turned over between year 1 and year 2, and the new staff lacked community contacts
necessary for recruitment. Finally, the principals of a couple of schools, hearing that the study
was being conducted by a group of Americans, refused balsakhis. Thus, only two thirds of the
schools assigned Balsakhis actually received them. (Schools could not refuse testing, because
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Pratham had obtained written permission for testing from the city administration). Throughout
the paper, the schools that were assigned balsakhis but did not get them are included in the
treatment group.
3.3.3 Outcomes
The main outcome of interest is whether the interventions resulted in any improvement in
cognitive skills. In the Vadodara pilot year, children were given a pretest in November, 2000,
and post-test in March, 2001. In the first full year, the Vadodara pretest was at the beginning of
the school year (August 2001), and the post test in March 2002. In the second full year, children
were tested at the beginning of the school year (August 2002), in November 2002, and again in
March, 2003. In the first year in Mumbai, children were tested in October, 2001 and March,
2002; in the second year tests were given in August, 2002, and February 2003.
In Vadodara, the same test is used for standard three and four children, so that the scores
can be directly compared across grades. Scores on the pre- and post-test can also be directly
compared, as the format of the questions and the competencies tested remain the same. The exam
comprises two parts: A math section and a language section. In Vadodara, both parts focused on
competencies that the Vadodara Municipal Corporation (VMC) prescribe for children in
standards one through four. On the math exam, for example, tasks ranged from basic number
recognition, counting, and ordering of single digit numbers to ordering of two digit numbers,
addition of single and two digit numbers, and basic word problems. Tests were similar in
Mumbai. In the first year, tests focused on competencies in standards one through three, while in
the second year they included standards one through four. In the second year, the same test was
used for third and fourth standard children.
The "pilot" year of the program (2000-2001) allowed Pratham to make significant
progress in developing a testing instrument (the initial test was too difficult) and effective testing
procedures to prevent cheating and exam anxiety. The test was administered in both cities by
Pratham, with the authorization of the municipal corporation. At least three Pratham employees
were present in the classroom during each test to minimize cheating. 27To minimize attrition,
27 In Mumbai, since administration of the pre-test was less than satisfactory at the first attempt, we conducted a
second pre-test, which we use as the basis for the analysis.
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Pratham returns to the schools multiple times, and children who still failed to appear and who
could be tracked down were administered a make-up test outside of school.
In Vadodara, the school year 2001-2002 was disturbed by massive inter-communal riots
following an attack on a train carrying Hindus. Although a post-test was conducted in March
(after the riots had receded), attrition was high. We thus use the October 2001 mid-test as the
"post-test" for year one in Vadodara.28 The year one pretests were in August (Vadodara) and
September (Mumbai) 2001, while the Mumbai year one post-test was in March 2001. In year 2,
the pretests were in August 2002 (both cities), and the post-tests in February (Bombay) and
March (Vadodara) 2003.
Another outcome of interest is attendance and school dropout rates, which are collected
weekly by Pratham employees, who made randomly timed weekly appearances in classrooms to
take attendance. (Data from the official rolls was also collected, but administrators have
incentives to inflate the attendance data).2 9
Finally, in the second year of the program, in both cities, data were collected on which
specific children were sent to the Balsakhi. (Balsakhis work with, on average, about 20 children
per school).
3.3.4 Statistical Framework
Effect of the Balsakhi Program on test scores
Given the randomized allocation of both programs, we expect the 2001 pre-test results in the
treatment schools to be similar between those in the control. The results of the 2002 pre-test may
be different in the treatment and control schools in standard four in Vadodara, as well as standard
three and four in Mumbai, since they may reflect long-lasting benefits of the previous year's
program for the children who were in the same school in the previous year. In both cities, the
experimental design (in which each school was both in the treatment and comparison group, with
one standard in each group) is such that even if a "good school" were in the treatment group for a
28 The results of the first year of the program do not significantly change if we use the mid- or post-test: There was
no further improvement (or deterioration) of the performance in the treatment schools relative to the control schools
between the mid-test and the post-test.
29 We report results from Mumbai in this draft. In Mumbai 2001-2002, teachers in some schools often refused to let
the research assistants count the number of children present, resulting in biased data.
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given standard, the other standard of that "good school" would be in the comparison group,
ensuring that the averages across the standard are likely to be very similar.
Denoting Yigk the test score of child i in grade g in school j in test k (k is either
"PRE" or "POST"), we start by comparing test scores in the treatment and comparison schools,
in each city and standard. First, we check that there is no difference between treatment and
control schools before the program was run:
YigPRE = a + PfDjg + gpRE , (3.1)
where Djg is a dummy indicating whether school j is in the treatment group in that particular
year in standard g, and pRE the error term.
This regression is run separately in each standard, year and city. It is run separately for
the math exam, the verbal exam, and the total score on the exam. The standard errors are
clustered at the school level.30
We then run the same regression in the post-period (k = POST ):
YigjPOST = a + fDjg + gPOST (3.2)
This provides a first estimate of the effect of being assigned to the treatment group. For all cities
and year, except for Mumbai in year 2, this is also an estimate of the average effect of being a
student in a school that was assigned a balsakhi. However, in Mumbai in year 2, because not all
schools received a balsakhi (and not all classes within schools where treated), to obtain the
average effect of receiving a balsakhi, we use the assignment to the treatment group ( Djg ) as an
instrument for whether or not the class of a specific child actually received the balsakhi (Bjg). In
practice, we are estimate the following equation:
YigiPOST = a + flBjg + igiPST . (3.3)
30 If we instead use a nested random effects model (with a classroom effect nested within a school effect), the point
estimates are very similar, and the the standard errors are smaller. Clustering is a more conservative approach.
97
The first stage is the equation for whether or not a child's class was actually assigned a
balsakhi:
Bjg = a, + 1iDjg + gjPosr . (3.4)
Because tests scores are very strongly auto-correlated, the precision of the estimate is increased
by controlling for the child's test score in the pre-test.
We do so using the following difference in difference specification:
Y,gk = 2 +SBj + BOPOSTk + y(B,g * POSTk) + gk, (3.5)
where POSTk is a dummy indicating whether the test is the post test. For all years and samples
except Mumbai in year 2 Bjg = Djg, and equation (3.5) is estimated with OLS. However, for
Mumbai in year two (and when both cities are pooled), equation (3.5) is estimated with
instrumental variables, with Djg (the initial assignment to the treatment group), POSTk, and
Djg * POSTk used as instruments.
We also present an alternative way to estimate the treatment effect in Mumbai, as a
specification check. Since every school was supposed to receive a balsakhi in either standard 3 or
standard 4, we keep in the sample only the schools that did receive a balsakhi. This means that a
school will not be in the comparison school for one standard if the other standard did not receive
a balsakhi. In this reduced sample, Bjg is equal to Djg, and equation (3.5) is estimated by OLS.
The assumption underlying this specification is that the characteristics that make the school more
likely to have a balsakhi have the same influence on the test scores of children in standard 3 and
standard 4.
To gain more insight about the impact of the program, we also present estimates of
specifications similar to equations (3.3) and (3.5) using for Yigk a binary variable indicating
whether the child correctly answered the questions indicating competencies for standard 1, 2 and
3, respectively. Finally, we estimate the impact of being in the program for 2 years (for children
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who were in the treatment group in standard 3 in year 1, and whom the balsakhi has followed in
year 2 when they moved to standard 4), by estimating equation (3.5) using the pre-test of year 1
as the pre-test, and the post test of year 2 as the post test.
Disentangling Class size and balsakhi effect
Estimating equations (3.3) and (3.5) generates estimates of the average impact of the program on
all children who whose standard-school received a balsakhi. The program may impact the
children in a treated school in two ways: directly, for children who were assigned to work with
the balsakhi, or indirectly, because the weakest children are removed from the classroom for part
of the day. This indirect effect can potentially work through two mechanisms: through a reduced
number of students in the class (class size effect), and through the higher average quality of their
classmates (tracking effect).
To separate the balsakhi and the indirect effects, an ideal experiment would have
identified the children who would work with the balsakhi in all schools, before randomly
assigning treatment and comparison groups (and to not allow substitution after the initial
allocation). The balsakhi effect could then be estimated by comparing children at risk of working
with the balsakhi in the treatment and the comparison group. The indirect effect would have been
estimated by comparing the children who were not at risk of working with the balsakhi in the
treatment and the comparison group. Unfortunately, this design was not practical in this setting.
We do know, however, that the assignment to the balsakhi group was based in part on
pre-test score, and that a maximum of twenty children per school in Vadodara, and twenty per
class in Mumbai were assigned to a balsakhi. In schools in the treatment group, we start by
predicting assignment to the balsakhi as a function of the number of students (in the school in
Vadodara, in the class in Mumbai), the sum of the math and verbal score at the pre-test, and a
variable indicating whether the child is among the bottom 20 children in his group.
Pvjg = ', + r2Sjg + Rr3ygpRE + r4Ro  + rsZjg  Clg (3.6)
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where S is the number of student in the class or the school, YipRE is the score of the child at
the pre-test, Ryg is the rank of the child in the class (starting from the bottom), and Z is a
dummy indicating whether the child is among the bottom 20 children in the class. We will show
that, even after controlling linearly for the class rank, the dummy Zjg predicts whether or not the
child was assigned to the balsakhi.
Denoting Xij the vector [Sg YgpR Rjg], the following equation (which interacts the
variables in equation (3.6) with a dummy for whether the child is in the balsakhi group) predicts
assignment to the balsakhi in the whole sample.
Pug = a + yDojg + 3 (Zjg * Dug ) + Zijg +X + (X'g * Dyg) + s6g (3.7)
We can then regress the post test scores on the same variables, and examine whether being one
of the bottom 20 children is associated with a bigger effect for those in the balsakhi group:
YgPOST - YgPRE = a + "Zg *Dg D + YDyg + XZt + gK + Xg * Dijg, + g (3.8)
Equation (3.7) and (3.8) form the first stage and the reduced form of a instrumental
variables estimation of the following equation:
YgPOST - YgPRE = a + g + yBg + Zg + XgKc + Xlg * Dig + i'g (3.9)
where Dg and Zg * Dg are the excluded instruments. The identification assumption underlying
this estimation strategy is that the only reason why the treatment effect varies with the variable
Zg is because Zg makes it more likely that the child is sent to the balsakhi group. However, the
effect of the treatment is allowed to vary with class size, the test score, and the rank of the child.
We also estimate an alternative specification which controls for a fourth-order polynomial in the
rank of the child. In this equation, the effect of being assigned to the balsakhi group is given by
], + 7, and the effect of being in a balsakhi school, but not assigned to the balsakhi group, is
given by y.
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3.3.5 Disentangling tracking and class size effects
The effect of the program on children who were not assigned to the balsakhi can be further
attributed to either a class size effect or a tracking effect: by removing the 20 weakest children in
the class, the program might allow the teacher to spend more time on more advanced topics, or
less time reviewing or disciplining children who do not follow the class.
To gain some insight on whether the two effects can be separated, we estimate an
equation where we interact the treatment dummy with the average pre-test score of children who
were sent to the balsakhi: if the test scores of children who go to the Balskahi are lower, the
tracking benefits to the remaining children should be bigger. To instrument for the test score of
the children who went to the Balsakhi, we use the average test score of the bottom twenty
children in the class. The reduced form equation is thus:
YgPosT =a + Zjg * Dg + rDjg + SDjg * T20jg + uZyg + X;g + Xg * DjgA + Eug (3.10)
where T20ig is the average test score among the bottom twenty children of school j. The
structural equation is:
Yjgos = a + + yB +  B g * TBjg + iZujg + Xi;gK + Xg * DgA + ig (3.11)
where TBjg is the average score among children who are assigned to the balsakhi.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Level of Competencies and Pre-intervention
Differences
Tables 2 through 5 present the descriptive statistics of the test scores for all samples used in this
analysis (year 1 and 2 in Vadodara and Mumbai). The scores are presented in three different
ways: percentage of points scored, normalized scores (relative to the distribution of the pre-test
score in the comparison group in each city and year),31 and as the percentage of children
correctly answering the questions in the test relating to the competencies in each standard.
The randomization appears to have been successful: Neither in Mumbai nor in Vadodara
are there any large or systematic differences between the pre-test score and the post-test score.
None of the differences between the groups prior to the implementation of the program are
significant.
The raw scores, and the percentage of children correctly answering the questions relating
to the curriculum in each standard give an idea of how little these children actually know. In
standard three in Vadodara in the second year, for example, the average student in math scores
about 16%, both in the control and treatment groups. Since one math question is multiple-choice,
on average a student who knows nothing will score 1.8% points. If a student can consistently
order two numbers and add two single digit numbers, she earns the additional 14% needed to
achieve the average third standard performance. Only 5.4% of third standard children in
Vadodara pass the standard 1 competencies in maths in standard 3 in Vadodara (and 14% in
Mumbai). Standard one competencies cover number recognition, counting and one digit addition
and subtraction.
The results are more encouraging in verbal competencies: 50% of the standard 3 children
pass the standard 1 competencies in Vadodara (reading a single word, choosing the right spelling
among different possible spelling for a word), and 65% do so in Mumbai.
31 Scores are normalized for each standard, year, and city, such that the mean and standard deviation of the
comparision group is zero and one, respectively. (We subtract the mean of the control group in the pre-test, and
divide by the standard deviation.) This allows for comparison across samples, as well with results from other
studies.
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3.4.2 Attrition
Table 6 presents the levels of attrition in Mumbai and Vadodara. We present attrition that
occurred between the pre-test and post-test for both cities in both years, as well as the two-year
attrition (in Mumbai, for standard 4 only), broken down by treatment status. Attrition was
generally very low, except for Vadodara in year 1. This is likely attributable to the civil unrest.
The post-test was conducted after the riots, and the research team attempted to track down all of
the children who did not appear for the exam. Attrition rates are not different in the comparison
group than in the treatment group: In year 1 in Vadodara, attrition was 19% in the balsakhi
treatment group, and 18% in the comparison group. In year 2, attrition was 4% in the balsakhi in
both the treatment and the comparison group. In Mumbai year 1, attrition was 7% in the
treatment group, and 7.5% in the comparison group, while in year 2 it was 7.7% in the treatment
group and 7.3% in the comparison group.
The fact that there was no differential attrition rate in the treatment and control groups
suggests that the estimate of the treatment effects will not be biased, unless different types of
people drop out from the sample in the treatment and the control groups (Angrist, 1995). This
does not seem to occur in our study: The second row in each panel presents the difference
between the score at the pre-test of children who were not present at the post-test, by treatment
status. The third column of each sample group present the differences-in-differences in the
treatment and comparison groups. Children who will eventually leave the sample tend to be at
the bottom of the distribution of the pre-test scores. However, the difference is very similar in the
treatment and control groups, in both years and for both programs. In Mumbai in the second
year, the difference-in-difference is almost statistically significant (p-value .067), with the
attritors in the treatment group seeming to perform relatively better than those in the comparison
group; this could be because the program encouraged weaker children to stay in school, making
it more likely that they could be tracked down for the post-test. If anything, this would bias the
estimates of the treatment effect downward.
Finally, both the attrition and the difference in test scores are also similar among the
bottom 20 children in each school, the group of children who were the most likely to be assigned
to a balsakhi (these results are not reported).
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3.4.3 Effects of the Balsakhi Program
Effect on attendance
Part of the goal of the program was to make it easier for parents to play a role in their children's
education, by serving as an intermediary between parents and the school environment. One could
therefore have expected an impact of the program on attendance. In practice, there does not seem
to be any: table 11 show two estimates of the program on attendance: a simple difference
(comparing average attendance in the treatment and the comparison schools) and a difference in
difference estimate (where we compare the change in attendance between the month of
September-October and January-February in the treatment and the comparison group). Using
either specification (and either the official roster data or data collected by our assistant) we do
not find any impact of the program on children's attendance.
Overall effect on test score
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the first estimates of the effect of the balsakhi program, as simple
differences between the post-test scores in the treatment and control groups. In all years and
standards, for both tests, and in both cities, and for all subgroups, the difference in post-test
scores between treatment and control groups is positive. In the first year in Vadodara (table 2),
the difference in post-test score between treatment and control groups was 0.17 standard
deviations in standard three for math, .15 in standard 3 for language, and .14 and .06 in standard
4, for math and language respectively.3 2 The results in Mumbai (table 4) are remarkably similar,
with the math and language test scores improving by 0.15 and 0.16 standard deviation,
respectively.
In the second year of the program, the effects are larger: In Vadodara (table 3), the
difference in total test scores is .44 for math and 0.25 for language in standard three, and .33 and
0.30 in standard four, for math and language respectively. In Mumbai in year two (table 5), the
IV estimate of the impact of the program on test scores differences in are .25 and .09 in standard
32 Throughout the paper, test results, differences, and differences-in-differences are presented in terms of standard
deviations, unless otherwise specified.
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3 (for math and language respectively) an .43 and .17 in standard 4 (for math and language
respectively). In year two in Vadodara, all of the differences between treatment and control
groups are statistically significant, while for Mumbai, the standard four results are significant.
Because test scores have a strong persistent component, the precision of these estimates
can be improved significantly, however, by turning to a differences-in-differences specification
(equation (3.5)). Since the randomization appeared to be successful, and attrition was low in both
the treatment and comparison groups, the point estimates should be similar in the simple
differences and the differences-in-differences specification. Table 7 presents differences-in-
differences estimates of the effects of the balsakhi program, in various years, cities, standards,
and sub-groups. For Mumbai in year 2, we estimate the treatment effect in two ways: first, we
instrument for the dummy indicating whether or not the school received a balsakhi with a
dummy for whether the school was assigned to the treatment group; second, we include only
schools that got a balsakhi in at least one standard in the sample. The estimates using either
specification are very similar.
As expected, the point estimates suggest a substantial treatment effect, and the standard
errors are lower than the simple differences. Pulling both cities and standard together (in the first
two rows of table 7), the impact of the program was 0.14 standard deviation overall in the first
year, and 0.25 standard deviation in the second year. Both estimates for total score are significant
at the 99% confidence level.
The impact is bigger in the second year, and bigger for math than for language in both
years (0.19 standard deviations versus 0.069 in the first year, and 0.32 versus 0.15 standard
deviations in the second year; all but first-year verbal scores are significant at the 99% level.) For
both years and both subjects, the effect is larger in Vadodara than in Mumbai (with a total-score
effect of 0.16 standard deviation versus 0.15 in the first year (standard 3 only), and 0.31 versus
0.15 in the second year (both standards)). The difference is the strongest for language, where
there is a significant impact in both years for Vadodara (0.11 and 0.23 standard deviation
respectively), but no significant impact in either year in Mumbai (0.06 standard deviation for
standard 3 in year 1, and 0.032 standard deviation in year 2). For both cities and both subjects,
the effects are very similar in standard 3 and standard 4. We also computed all those estimates
for both genders separately, and found the impact to be very similar (results not reported).
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In the last panel of the table, we display our estimate of the impact of the program for two
years (for children who were in a treatment school in standard 3, and stayed in the treatment
school). First, it appears that the effect of the first year does not seem to persist over the summer:
at the pre-test in year 2, children who were in a treatment class in year 1 do not seem to know
more than children who weren't. However, the effect of two years of treatment (from yearl pre-
test score to year 2 post-test score) is substantially larger than that of either individual year (0.52
standard deviation in math, for example, versus 0.38 for one year): it- seems likely that the
foundation laid in the first year of the program helped the children benefit from the second year
of the program.
Compared to the other educational interventions, this program thus appear to be quite
effective. The Tennessee STAR experiment, for example, where class size was reduced by 7 to 8
children (from 22 to about 15), improved test scores by about 0.21 standard deviation. This
program improved test scores by 0.25 standard deviations in the second year, by reducing
effective class size from 35 to 20 children on average (averaging over the balsakhi and the non-
balsakhi group) for part of the day, but doing so by hiring an assistant
paid a fraction of the teacher's salary.
Effect on specific competencies
The test was designed to cover competencies from standard 1 to 3. In Mumbai in year 2, it also
covered some standard 4 competencies. Table 8 offers more details on the level at which the
program was effective. Estimates in this table suggest that, for math, the biggest effect was on
the competencies of standard 1: in Vadodara for example, the program increased the fraction of
children who mastered the competencies of the first standard in math by 5.0% in the first year,
and 6.4% in the second year. In Mumbai the effect was 5.8% and 8.8% respectively. The effect
on the fraction of children demonstrating knowledge of standard 2 and 3 competencies is much
smaller. In language, the most important effect seems to be to help children master the
competencies of standard 2 This may not be surprising, since many children seemed to have
already mastered the competencies of standard 1. The effect of the program may thus be the
strongest on the easiest competencies not already mastered by many pupils. These results
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correspond well with the stated role of the program, which was to work with children on basic
competencies.
Distributional effects
The balsakhi program was primarily intended to help children at the lower end of the ability
distribution, by providing especially targeted instruction. However, as we already mentioned, it
could still help the higher scoring children, either because they are assigned to the balsakhi, or
because they benefit from smaller classes when their classmates are with the balsakhi. In table 9,
we directly ask whom the program benefitted, by breaking down the sample into thirds in the
distribution of initial test scores. The effect of the program is indeed the strongest for children in
the bottom of the pre-test score distribution. Taking both cities together, the impact in the first
year on overall test scores was 0.21 in the bottom third, 0.12 in the middle third, and 0.08 in the
top third. In the second year, the impact was respectively 0.32, 0.18 and -0.003. Children in the
bottom of the distribution were also much more likely to see the balsakhi: 22% from the bottom
third, compared to 16% from the middle third and 6% from the top third were sent to the
balsakhi. By increasing scores of the lowest-scoring children more than their peers, the program
has an equalizing effect on pupil achievement. It is worth noting that this occurs even in the
Indian education system, which, like many in developing countries, places particular emphasis
on the children who perform well The effect of the program on the bottom third of the
distribution are impressive: in the second year, the math test scores increased by 0.46 standard
deviation in Vadodara, and 0.51 in Mumbai. The language test score increased by 0.31 standard
deviation in Vadodara, and 0.13 in Mumbai.
3.4.4 Inside the box: Balsakhi, class size, and tracking effects
These results lead to our next question: to what extent is the program effect due to a direct effect
of the balsakhi teacher (affecting only the children who got assigned to the balsakhi group) and
to an indirect effect, affecting children who were not assigned to the balsakhi group. The fact that
both the program impact and the probability of being assigned to a balsakhi declines with a
child's position in the test score distribution suggest that the impact of the program may have
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been larger for those who were actually assigned to the balsakhi. However, an alternative
plausible explanation for this patter is that the direct (or indirect) effects of the test score are
lower for children with higher test scores. This question therefore necessitates further
investigation.
As we explained above, we propose using a dummy for whether a child belongs to the
bottom 20 children of a class as an instrument for whether he is assigned to the balsakhi group.
Columns 1 to 4 in table 10 show that in both Mumbai and in Vadodara, a dummy for whether a
child belongs to the bottom 20 in his class predicts his assignment to the balsakhi, even after
controlling for her rank, her score at the pre-test, and the number of students in her class (which
are all negatively and significantly associated with assignment to the balsakhi). Not surprisingly,
because some schools in Bombay were not assigned a balsakhi, all coefficients are smaller. In
column 4, we include a fourth-order polynomial of rank (interacted with treatment); the dummy
for child rank below 20 remains a significant predictor of assignment to the balsakhi group. In
columns 5 to 8, we present the reduced form estimates for test score gain. The coefficient of the
interaction between the dummy for belonging to the bottom 20 children in the class and
belonging to a treatment school is significant in all of these columns, which indicates that,
conditional on being in a school assigned to the treatment group, the treatment effect is actually
bigger if the child is more likely to be assigned to the balsakhi. The treatment effect also appears
to be declining with initial test score and the number of students in the class, though, controlling
for the rank of the child, this effect is not very large.
In panel B of table 10, we present instrumental variables estimates of the direct and
indirect impact of being in a balsakhi group. The direct effect is the sum of the coefficient on the
dummy for whether the school gets a balsakhi and on the dummy for whether the child is
assigned to the balsakhi group. In both Mumbai and Vadodara, the coefficient for whether or not
the child is assigned to the balsakhi is positive, significant, and large (0.89 standard deviations in
Vadodara, and 1.3 standard deviations in Mumbai.) This suggests that the children actually
assigned to the balsakhi benefit much more than others in their school. In Mumbai, the treatment
effect on those who were not sent to the balsakhi is negligible. In Vadodara, it is 0.21 standard
deviations. Unfortunately, the estimate is too noisy to be distinguished from zero. Pooling both
sample, we find an effect of 0.23 for children not assigned to the balsakhi in treatment school,
and an additional 0.95 standard deviation for children who are assigned.
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Clearly, while there is some (not very conclusive) evidence of an indirect effect for
children who remained in class, the main reason the program is effective seems to be that it
delivers more effective education to the children who were actually with the balsakhi. Part of this
is probably due to the fact that the children assigned to work with the balsakhi ended up in much
smaller classes than those who weren't, given the initial large class sizes in both cities. The
reduction in class size was somewhat larger for children who were assigned to the balsakhi,
because they were moved to classes whose average size was 20. However, if one believes the
point estimate, the effect of the program for children assigned to the balsakhi group is more than
five time the size of the effect for other children, which suggest that the balsakhi is a more
effective teacher for these children.
In Vadodara, a mid-test was conducted, as well as a pre- and post- test. We conduct the
analysis for both tests separately. It appears that, during the period between the pre and the mid
test, both the balsakhi and the non-balskahi children benefitted equally from the program (the
balsakhi dummy is not significant). Between the mid-test and the post-test, however, only
children allocated to the balsakhi group benefitted.
Finally, we examine whether there is any evidence of a positive (or negative) impact of
tracking by interacting the dummy for being in the treatment group with the average score of the
bottom 20 children in the school. In Vadodara pre to mid-test, the effect of being in a balsakhi
school for children who were not allocated to the balsakhi group declines with the initial test
score of the children, which is consistent with a positive impact of tracking.
3.5 Cost Benefit Analysis
In seeking to improve the academic performance of schoolchildren, governments could
potentially hire additional teachers, or hire balsakhis. Data on the cost of teachers, combined
with the results presented above, give an idea of the cost effectiveness of each option. Table 12
shows the cost per student per year of the balsakhi program. While the data available from the
municipalities about the cost of the program in Vadodara and Mumbai are not directly
comparable to each other (for Vadodara we have the total cost of schoolteachers, while for
Mumbai we know the starting salary of a new teacher), we use measures of the Pratham program
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cost that are comparable within cities.3 3 The program cost 91 rupees, (about 2 dollars) per
student34 in Vadodara, and 54 Rupees (or 1 dollar) per child in Mumbai, while the teacher salary
cost per student of the Vadodara and Mumbai Municipal Corporations are 3,168 Rupees and
1318 Rupees, respectively. (The cost per student/year increased in Mumbai in year 2 because the
wage of the balsakhi was increased from 500 to 750 Rs./month).
Table 13 combines these numbers with the test score improvements over the pre- to post-
test in years 1 and 2. Since the post-test used the same structure as the pre-test, improvement of
the control children between the pre- and the post-test provides a measure of the effect of being
in school for one year, which can be compared with the effect of having a balsakhi over the same
period. Clearly, this is only suggestive, since children's competency over a year may change for
reasons other than being in school. In year 1 in Vadodara, the estimate of the treatment effect
was about 40% as large as the improvement between the pre-test and the post-test in the
comparison group. The ratio of the cost per child is however 35. This calculation suggests that
the average balsakhi is about 12-16 times more cost effective (in terms of improvement in test
scores) than the average teacher. In the second year, the balsakhi program appears to be 11-12
times more cost effective than the average teacher. The results in Mumbai also suggest the
Balsakhi program is dramatically more cost effective. In the first year, the treatment effect was
half as large as the gains made by the comparison group, while the cost ratio was 24, suggesting
Balsakhis are thirteen times more cost effective than teachers. In the second year, the treatment
effect was 1/10 (respectively 1/4) as large in the third (fourth) standard as the comparison groups
gains, giving a cost advantage of 2 in the third standard, and of six in the fourth standard. It is
important to note that this results do not suggest that teachers should be replaced by balsakhis,
since balsakhis are always complementing the teachers. The results do provide evidence that if
the Mumbai and Vadodara Municipalities wanted to spend additional resources, hiring balsakhis
may be a more effective way to do it than hiring additional teachers.
33 We also have cost data from Vadodara in 2001-2002, and from Mumbai in 2002-2003. As costs did not change
appreciably from one year to the next, we use these figures for cost-benefit comparisons for both years.
3 The denominator includes all students in standards three and four in the treatment schools, since we will also use
average test scores.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper reports the preliminary results of a remedial education program. The program has
already shown that it can be brought to scale, since it is already reaching tens of thousands of
children across India. Evaluations conducted in two cities over two years suggest that this is a
remarkably effective and cost effective program: Test scores of children whose schools benefited
from the program improved by .12 to 0.16 standard deviations in the first year, and .15 to 0.3
standard deviations in the second year. At the margin, the program is up to 12-16 times more
effective than resources spent on teachers. Results are even stronger for children in the bottom of
the distribution (in the bottom third of the distribution, the program improved tests score by 0.22
standard deviations in the first year, and 0.58 in the second year).
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